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Articles
The Single European Act: A New
Constitution for the Community?
GEORGE A. BERMANN*
If proof were needed that the European Economic Community is
still the product of a careful tempering of integrationist impulses with
preoccupations ot national sovereignty, the recently ratified Single
European Act' (Single Act or Act) amply supplies it. Although the
Single Act represents the most comprehensive revision to date of the
Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty),2 which established the European Eco-
nomic Community (European Community or Community), it also
reflects the continuing vitality of the view that functional change
within the Community takes priority in time over structural and insti-
tutional reform. Rather than place European integration on a new set
of political foundations, as many influential voices had urged, the Sin-
gle European Act brings a combination of programmatic change and
limited structural reform. While disappointing to some observers,
mostly because the institutional framework of Europe remains largely
the same and because the more important programmatic changes are
not conspicuous on the face of the document, the Single European
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1. Single European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 169) 1 (1987), reprinted in 25
I.L.M. 506 (1986) [hereinafter SEA]. The Act w," signed by nine Member States at Luxem-
bourg, Feb. 17, 1986, and by the other three at The Hague, Feb. 28, 1986. It came into force
on July 1, 1987. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. I 1 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958). The Single European
Act's amendments to the existing Community treaties relate in almost all cases to the EEC
Treaty. In fact, the European Community is composed of three communities: the European
Economic Community the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic
Energy Community. Apart from the few provisions concerning the Court of Justice, none of
the treaty amendments introduced by the Single European Act affects the Treaty Establishing
the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC
Treaty], or the Euratom Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter EAEC Treaty].
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Act actually corresponds well to the realities of Community-building
in a pragmatic-minded late twentieth century Europe.
I. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND
By 1985, after years of constitutional self-examination, the Euro-
pean Community appeared to have reached a point of no return in the
area of institutional reform. Since 1969, the Community had been the
object of an almost continuous stream of studies and measures
designed either to improve the functioning of its institutions or to pro-
duce a more cohesive legal order, or both.' Only in December 1985,
when the heads of state and government met as the European Council
in Luxembourg, did the Member States finally settle upon a mutually
agreeable framework for comprehensive reform. This framework was
the Single European Act.
A parliamentary initiative led by Altiero Spinelli, an Italian
member of the European Parliament and former European Commis-
sioner, had begun the process that led to the adoption of the Single
Act. Encouraged by certain institutional gains that the Parliament
had made in previous years,4 Spinelli's committee on institutional
3. These initiatives are briefly described in Edward, The Impact of the Single Act on the
Institutions, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 19 (1987); Murphy, The Single European Act, 20
IRISH JURIST 17, 18-30 (1985). Among the milestones are: (1) the final communiqu6 of the
Paris summit meeting of October 1972, declaring an intention to complete the economic and
monetary union and to establish a European Union by 1980, see Attainment of the Economic
and Monetary Union, 6 BULL EUR. COMM. (Supp. 5) 5 (1973); (2) the decision taken at the
Paris summit of 1974 to institutionalize the summit meetings of heads of state and government
in the form of a European Council to convene regularly at least three times a year and to serve
as the highest instance both in Community affairs and in European political cooperation, Meet-
ing of the Heads of Government, 7 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 12) 6 (1974); (3) approval by the
foreign ministers in 1970 and 1973 of a system of political cooperation in foreign policy con-
sisting of regular consultation, harmonization of views and the possibility of joint action,
Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification, 3
BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 11) 9 (1970) (Luxembourg Report); Political Cooperation Between
the Nine, 6 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 9) 12 (1973) (Copenhagen Report); (4) issuance in 1973
of a Declaration on European Identity and the common declaration by the institutions of an
intent to respect the European Human Rights Convention, Declaration on European Identity, 6
BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 12) 118 (1973); Common Declaration by Parliament, the Council and
the Commission, on Fundamental Rights, 10 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 3) 5 (1977); (5) estab-
lishment of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund by the Council in 1973 and of the
European Monetary System by the European Council meeting at Bremen and Brussels in
1978, see infra notes 113-115; (6) issuance in 1975 of the Tindemans Report, commissioned at
the 1974 summit, on the needs of European union, Report on European Union, 9 BULL. EUR.
COMM. (Supp. 1) (1976); and (7) the report of the "Three Wise Men" (B. Biesheuvel, E. Dell &
R. Marjolin), presented to the European Council in 1979 on the subject of institutional and
procedural reform. COMMITTEE OF THE THREE TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, REPORT ON
EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS (1979). A summary of this 100-page report appears in 12 BULL.
EUR. COMM. (No. 11) 25 (1979).
4. In 1976, the Council of Ministers (Council) issued a decision, contemplated in the
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affairs set out to formulate major amendments to the EEC Treaty. In
the end, the committee drafted an altogether new Treaty of European
Union (Draft Treaty or European Union Treaty).5 Approved over-
whelmingly by the full Parliament in February 1984, the European
Union Treaty was submitted for consideration to the parliaments and
governments of the Member States.
The Draft Treaty vividly illustrates a political as opposed to a
functional approach to European integration. It contemplated the
creation of a European Union composed of the citizens of the Mem-
ber States, who were also to be citizens of the Union.6 The European
Council would constitute the Union's collective head of state. All of
the Community's existing legislation and other achievements, except
as amended by the Draft Treaty itself, were to constitute the law of
the Union. This law would embrace not only the activities of the
three existing communities, but also the programs of European mone-
tary and political cooperation which had previously been conducted
on a separate basis.
The drafters provided two means for the Union to accomplish its
goals: 1) through common action by Union institutions, and 2)
through cooperative action (action by the constituent states voting in
the European Council).7 Like many modern constitutions, the Draft
original EEC Treaty, setting out the methods and dates for the direct election by universal
suffrage of the European Parliament. Council Decision 76/787, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
278) 5-6 (1976). The first direct election took place in June 1979, thus finally lending the
institution democratic legitimacy. In addition, Parliament had begun exercising its newly-
acquired budgetary prerogatives by vetoing the draft budget on several occasions. Finally, the
Court of Justice acknowledged that failure to consult Parliament as required by the Treaty was
a ground for annulling a Council regulation. Roquette Fr~res v. Council, Case 138/79, 1980
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3333, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8703
(1980); Maizena GmbH v. Council, Case 139/79, 1980 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 3393, [1979-
1981 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8704 (1980).
5. Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 77) 33
(1984) [hereinafter Draft Treaty]. For a detailed discussion of the Draft Treaty, see R.
BIEBER, J.-P. JACQUt & J. WEILER, AN EVER CLOSER UNION (1984); F. CAPOTORTI, M.
HILF, F. JACOBS & J.-P. JACQUt, THE EUROPEAN UNION TREATY (1986); Jacqu6, The Draft
Treaty Establishing the European Union, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 19 (1985); Lodge, Free-
stone & Davidson, Some Problems of the Draft Treaty on European Union, 9 EuR. L. REV. 387
(1984).
6. Significantly, the Draft Treaty provided that it would enter into force upon the con-
sent of the governments of a majority of the Member States whose population represented two-
thirds of the current Community's total population. Thus, the consent of all the Member
States was not required. Draft Treaty, supra note 5, art. 82.
7. Id. art. 10. The Draft Treaty expressly embraced as matters of Union concern social
and health policy, consumer and environmental protection, regional policy, and policy in the
areas of education, research, culture and information. Id. arts. 55-62. Whether the interna-
tional relations of the Union were to be carried out by common action or by cooperation was
to depend on whether the Union had exclusive or concurrent competence in the subject matter.
For certain fields (including international relations and industrial cooperation), the Treaty pro-
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Treaty distinguished between exclusive and concurrent Union
competences. The Member States could not act in those matters
within the Union's exclusive competence.8 However, where compe-
tences were concurrent,9 Member States would be free to act until the
Union had done so.10 The European Union immediately granted the
fundamental rights and freedoms recognized by the Member States
and the European Human Rights Convention" to all persons coming
within its jurisdiction, but also committed itself to introducing a bill
of rights proper into the Treaty within five years.
The drafters of the European Union Treaty contemplated major
institutional changes as well, the most dramatic of which affected the
European Parliament. Jointly with the Council of the Union, the suc-
cessor to the Council of Ministers (Council), Parliament was to exer-
cise legislative authority' 2 and participate in both budgetary matters
and the conclusion of international agreements. The Treaty also gave
Parliament the right to confirm nominations to the Commission and
to approve the Commission's program before its members could take
office. 13
Mobilized by Parliament's bold proposals for Community re-
vided a procedure for transferring from the cooperation to the common action regime. Id. art.
11.
Just as before, the European Council would bring together the heads of state or govern-
ment of the Member States. This is still the case under the Single Act. See infra note 164.
8. The difference between exclusive and concurrent Union competence is set out in arti-
cle 12 of the Draft Treaty. Draft Treaty, supra note 5, art. 12. Matters within the Union's
exclusive competence included freedom of movement in the common market and European
trade and competition policy. Id. arts. 47, 48 & 64(2).
9. Matters falling within the areas of concurrent competence included monetary and
sectoral policy. Id. arts. 51, 53.
10. In areas of concurrent competence, Union action was to be subject to the "sub-
sidiarity principle." The subsidiarity principle in concurrent jurisdiction is stated in article
12(2) as follows:
The Union shall only act to carry out those tasks which may be undertaken more
effectively in common than by the Member States acting separately, in particular
those whose execution requires action by the Union because their dimension or
effects extend beyond national frontiers.
Id. art. 12(2). Thus, the Union was to act if and when common action would be more effective
than separate Member State action.
11. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
12. Draft Treaty, supra note 5, art. 36. Article 38 demonstrates that Parliament's legisla-
tive authority under the Draft Treaty did not rise to the level of co-decision with the Council.
However, Parliament's active opposition to a measure would defeat it in the legislative process.
Id. art. 38(1).
13. Id. art. 16. Under the Draft Treaty, the European Council would appoint the Presi-
dent of the Commission following the European elections. The President in turn would select
his or her colleagues. Members of the Commission would have to resign as a body in the event
Parliament by a qualified majority vote adopted a motion of censure. Id. arts. 25, 29, 31.
[27:529
SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT. NEW CONSTITUTION
form, the Member States sought to seize the initiative. Even before
Parliament had spoken, the foreign ministers of Germany and Italy
had developed the Genscher/Colombo Plan 4 which bears their
names and pursued objectives broadly comparable to those of the
Draft Treaty. In the end, however, all that emerged from the Plan
was the "Solemn Declaration on European Union," a general state-
ment of aspirations issued by the European Council at Stuttgart in
June 1983.15 The failure to achieve concrete results has been attrib-
uted to the Member States' unreadiness to escalate their level of com-
mitment to the Community without first resolving certain chronic
points of dispute-the budget, agricultural policy and the political
aspects of the Community's enlargement. 16
The Stuttgart Declaration represented an inadequate response to
the European Parliament's call for sweeping reform. However, bol-
stered by successful meetings at Brussels in March 1984 and at Fon-
tainebleau in June 1984, and prodded by Parliament's adoption of the
Draft Treaty in February 1984, the European Council finally decided
to act. At Fontainebleau, the Council established an ad hoe commit-
tee on institutional affairs (Dooge Committee), composed of Member
State representatives, to examine the general state of European polit-
ical cooperation and union. The committee was to report back to the
Council at its Milan meeting in June 1985.17
As might have been expected of a group of Member State repre-
sentatives, as opposed to a Community institution like the European
Parliament, the Dooge Committee generated a considerably more
cautious set of recommendations than those embodied in the Draft
14. The official name for the Genscher/Colombo Plan was the Draft European Act. For
the text, see Appendix A of Neville-Jones, The Genscher/Colombo Proposals on European
Union, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 657, 685-90 (1983). Basically, it envisaged achieving closer
political union through a combination of Community action and political cooperation, coupled
with enhanced participation by Parliament and greater use of majority voting.
15. Solemn Declaration of European Union, 16 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) 24 (1983)
[hereinafter Stuttgart Declaration].
16. See Feld & Mahant, New Efforts for European Union: Hopes, Progress, and Disap-
pointments, 10 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 39, 46-47 (1986); Glaesner, The Single European Act, 6
Y.B. EUR. L. 283 (1987).
17. Glaesner, supra note 16, at 284. The European Council at the same time organized a
second committee, the Adonnino Committee, to investigate means of deepening the Commu-
nity-mindedness of the peoples of Europe. In a pair of reports, the Adonnino Committee
recommended such diverse measures as elimination of boundary checks on persons and goods.
a general system for the recognition of equivalence in university diplomas, voting rights for
Community citizens, greater cultural cooperation including creation of a European Academy
of Science, Technology and Art, greater cooperation on drug abuse and other social problems,
the "twinning" of towns, and the adoption of community flags, emblems and anthems. A
People's Europe: Reports from the Ad Hoc Committees, 18 BULL. EUR. CoMM. (Supp. 7) 7, 17
(1985). Both committees' reports were approved by the European Council. Id. at 15, 31.
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Treaty. Its report emphasized functional and programmatic change
over wholesale institutional reform.' In fact, rather than build upon
the Draft Treaty, which many had come to view more as a political
statement than a blueprint for reform, 19 or make a counterproposal,
the committee, by divided vote, proposed convening an intergovern-
mental conference under article 236 of the EEC Treaty for the pur-
pose of negotiating amendments to the existing treaties.20 - By the time
the European Council met in Milan to consider the Dooge Committee
report, it had received a detailed Commission white paper forcefully
advocating completion of the Community's internal market by 1992.21
The Commission's strong appeal for the removal of all physical, tech-
nical and fiscal barriers to trade encouraged the Council, again over
the dissent of several states, to convene an intergovernmental confer-
ence to consider all aspects of Community reform.22
Notwithstanding the divided vote, every Member State, plus the
prospective members Spain and Portugal, participated in the ensuing
intergovernmental conference held in Luxembourg in September
1985. The conference's work was divided into two dossiers: 1) regu-
larizing the process of European political cooperation that had
18. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Institutional Affairs, 18 BULL. EUR. COMM.
(No. 3) 102 (1985) [hereinafter Dooge Committee Report]. Programmatic change included:
creation of a truly homogeneous internal economic area, promotion of common policies in
noneconomic domains (environment, social policy, culture, the judiciary), and intensified for-
eign policy and defense cooperation. On the institutional side, the Dooge Committee called
for, among other things, greater use of majority voting, more delegation to the Commission,
less reliance on the European Council, and the vesting of limited decisional power in Par-
liament.
19. Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on the "Single European Act," 24 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 9, 14 (1987).
20. See Lodge, The Single European Act: Towards a New Euro-Dynamism?, 24 J. COM-
MON MKT. STUD. 203, 208 (1986). Denmark, Greece and the United Kingdom objected.
21. Completing the Internal Market: Commission White Paper to the European Council,
COM(85)310 final (June 14, 1985) (also known as the Cockfield Report) [hereinafter Commis-
sion White Paper]. The White Paper constituted an ambitious program of economic integra-
tion initially built upon 310 specific pieces of legislation intended to eliminate existing physical,
technical and fiscal barriers to the internal market. The Commission envisaged two principal
kinds of measures to complete the market: harmonization legislation and the mutual recogni-
tion of national standards. For each item, the White Paper projected a date between 1985 and
1992 for Commission proposal and Council enactment. The net effect of additions, deletions
and consolidations to the program between 1985 and 1988 has been to reduce the total number
of legislative actions required for completion of the internal market to 279 as of November
1988. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: An Area
Without Internal Frontiers/The Progress Report Required by Article 8B of the Treaty,
COM(88)650 final 4 (Nov. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Commission Midterm Report].
22. 18 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 3) 14 (1985). Denmark, Greece and the United King-
dom again dissented. Article 236 of the EEC Treaty does not require a unanimous vote of the
Member States on the decision to hold an intergovernmental conference. See generally De
Zwaan, The Single European Act: Conclusion of a Unique Document, 23 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 747, 750-51 (1986).
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developed over the previous fifteen years on a mostly informal and
intergovernmental basis, and 2) achieving agreement on specific
amendments to the EEC Treaty reflecting the combination of modest
institutional and programmatic changes that the Dooge Committee,
the Commission, and certain national delegations appeared to sup-
port. By early December, the Conference had reached a consensus on
most substantive matters and shortly thereafter the foreign ministers
agreed to deal in a single text with both the status of European polit-
ical cooperation and the amendments to the Community treaties.
That decision, intended to demonstrate the linkage between these two
approaches to Community reform, ultimately gave the Single Euro-
pean Act its name.23
The Single European Act was opened for signature on February
17, 1986. Most of the Member States promptly signed the treaty, but
Denmark, Greece and Italy waited until a special Danish referendum
on the matter had been approved. Ratification by all of the Member
States followed within the year, and the Act entered into force on July
1, 1987. 24
II. THE CENTERPIECE: COMPLETION OF THE
INTERNAL MARKET
The central programmatic feature of the Single European Act is
its goal of completing the European Community's internal market by
December 31, 1992.25 In emphasizing functional economic
23. See SEA, supra note 1, art. 1, para. I ("The European Communities and European
Political Cooperation shall have as their objective to contribute together to making concrete
progress towards European unity."). The Commission previously had urged that all changes
be dealt with in the same text. De Zwaan, supra note 22, at 753.
24. The effective date of the Act, originally January 1, 1987, had to be postponed due to
a challenge in the Irish courts to the constitutionality of Ireland's ratification. The Irish
Supreme Court eventually ruled that Title III of the Single European Act-the provisions on
European political cooperation-could not be ratified without a national referendum. Crotty
v. An Taoiseach & Others, 7 I.L.R.M. 400, [1987] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 666 (Ir. S.C. 1987). A
May 1987 referendum resulted in a constitutional amendment permitting ratification. See
Lang, The Irish Court Case which Delayed the Single European Act. Crotty v. An Taoiseach
and Others, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 709 (1987); Sherlock, Constitutional Law: Sovereignty,
the Constitution and the Single European Act, 9 DUBLIN U.L.J. 101 (1987).
The term "Final Act" refers to the official communication of the Single European Act by
the inter-governmental conference that produced it. Final Act of the Conference of the Euro-
pean Communities'Member States, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169)20 (1987), reprinted in 25
I.L.M. 504 (1986) [hereinafter FinalAct]. The significance of the Final Act lies in the fact that
it conveys by way of annex a series of declarations to the Single European Act, the first eleven
of which were adopted by the intergovernmental conference upon signature of the text and the
remaining nine of which were interposed by certain institutions or Member States and only
"noted" by the conference in the Final Act.
25. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 8A, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 13. On the legal
effect of the deadline for completion of the internal market, see infra note 90.
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integration, the Member States essentially followed the approach
advanced by the Commission in its December 1985 White Paper. 6
Nevertheless, considering that the creation of a common market fig-
ured among the Community's original and most central objectives,
one may ask what more is meant by the new internal market program.
The amended Treaty itself refers only to the establishment by 1992 of
"an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty. '27 This vague formulation prompted for-
mer Judge Pescatore of the European Court of Justice to describe the
1992 deadline as an anticlimactic prolongation of the transitional
period for achieving the Community's original goals.28
In its attempt to complete the internal market, the Single Euro-
pean Act merits a more favorable evaluation. It is no secret that on
its thirtieth anniversary the Community still had not fully removed all
physical, technical and fiscal barriers to trade. Physical barriers,
mostly in the shape of border formalities, have not been dismantled
because certain customs and fiscal operations, safeguard measures,
and Member State policing of terrorist and other illicit activities con-
tinue to be allowed.2 9 Technical barriers to intra-Community trade
refer to the restraints on the free movement of goods caused by differ-
ences among national regulatory standards. The removal of these
nontariff barriers has been gradual and incomplete due to the slow
26. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. The December 31, 1992 target date was
drawn from the Commission's White Paper as well.
27. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 8A, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 13. Timely
progress toward completion of the internal market was to be monitored through reports sub-
mitted by the Commission to the Council by December 31, 1988 and December 31, 1990. Id.
art. 8B, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 14. For the 1988 report, see Commission Midterm
Report, supra note 21. That report was preceded by three annual progress reports on the
internal market program. Commission of the European Communities, First, Second and Third
Reports from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament ol the Implementa-
tion of the Commission's White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, COM(86)300 final
(May 26, 1986), COM(87)203 final (May 11, 1987), COM(88)134 final (March 21, 1988)
(respectively) [hereinafter First, Second and Third Commission Report, respectively].
On the meaning of the term "internal market," see Ehlermann, The Internal Market Fol-
lowing the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 361, 364-70 (1987).
28. Pescatore, supra note 19, at 11-12. See also Feld & Mahant, supra note 16, at 39;
Forwood & Clough, The Single European Act and Free Movement. Legal Implications of the
Provisions for the Completion of the Internal Market, 1986 EUR. L. REV. 383 (1987).
29. Member State border controls also collect data on trade flow within the Community.
An example of recent progress in eliminating physical barriers to trade was the 1988 replace-
ment of the various national customs forms by a uniform customs form called the Single
Administrative Document. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 79) 1 (1985). For criticism of the
Council's slowness in facilitating the free movement of persons across Member State frontiers,
see Note, The Elimination of European Community Border Formalities, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 369
(1987).
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legislative process of harmonizing national laws and the need for case
by case rulings on the conformity of national standards to directly
effective 31 principles of free movement found in the EEC Treaty and
secondary legislation.3' To assist both of these processes, a recent
directive requires Member States to inform the Commission before
introducing any new technical standards and to explain the need for
them. 32 Fiscal barriers, finally, are created by differences in the bases
and rates of indirect taxation among the Member States and by the
frontier collection process for these taxes. There are obvious limits to
what the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice can do to lower these
barriers, and the Community has therefore relied greatly on the slow
and uncertain process of fiscal harmonization.3 Beyond trade in
goods, completion of the internal market implies a freer movement of
persons, services and capital. Progress in these areas likewise depends
on the Court's direct effects jurisprudence and on the positive
30. According to case law of the European Court of Justice, a provision of the EEC
Treaty or of secondary Community legislation is directly effective when it confers rights upon
individuals that national authorities (administrative and judicial alike) are bound to respect
and enforce. To have direct effect, a Community law provision generally must be clear, precise
and unconditional, and must not be subject to further measures on the part of the Member
States or Community institutions, or otherwise leave them substantial discretion. The leading
decision applying this direct effects doctrine is Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tariefcom-
missie, Case 26/62, 9 Receuil 1, [1963] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 105 (1963).
31. Article 30 of the EEC Treaty in particular prohibits "[q]uantitative restrictions on
imports and all measures having equivalent effect . . . between Member States," subject to
exceptions on various policy grounds set out in article 36 ("public morality, public policy or
public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of
national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of
industrial and commercial property"). EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 30 & 36. See generally
Lonbay, The Single European Act, 11 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 31 (1988). Related obsta-
cles to the free movement of goods identified in the White Paper include Member State pro-
curement policies and the existence of national systems of trademark, copyright and patent
protection, among others.
32. Council Directive 83/189, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 109) 8 (1983). With certain
exceptions, the adoption of any such measures is subject to mandatory delay if either the Com-
mission or another Member State objects to them on the ground that they impair the free
movement of goods. See infra note 65. This same procedure has been extended from the
industrial products field to the food, drugs and cosmetics fields. Council Directive 88/182, 31
O.J. EUR. CoMm. (No. L 81) 75 (1988). A standing committee of Member State representa-
tives has been set up under the directive to foster Member State dialogue on the problem of
protectionist national legislation. On newer approaches to the harmonization of technical
norms generally, see Waelbroeck, L'Harmonisation des rigles et normes techniques dans la
CEE, 24 CAI-IERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN [C.D.E.] 243 (1988).
33. See Commission White Paper, supra note 21, at 41-54. The Commission has since
declared the convergence of value added tax (VAT) and excise rates to be a matter of urgency.
Third Commission Report, supra note 27, at 29. An example of other changes that will be
necessary is the establishment of a clearing system to ensure, in the absence of fiscal frontiers,
that VAT revenues are properly allocated. For a discussion of these and other post-Single Act
initiatives, see Bos & Nelson, Indirect Taxation and the Completion of the Internal Market of
the EC, 27 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 27 (1988).
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harmonization of national laws-the former afflicted by the inevitable
defects of a rule of reason approach and the latter by the institutional
impediments to the passage of Community legislation.34
To the extent that the Single Act provides legally and politically
effective means for remedying the Community's failure to accomplish
original Treaty goals, it contributes substantially to the building of
Europe. The first of these means, treated at greater length in this
article under the heading of institutional reform,3 5 involves the
relatively simple expedient of changing from unanimity to qualified
majority the Council of Ministers' vote required to adopt certain
measures needed to complete the internal market. A rule of unanim-
ity traditionally has made it possible for a dissenting member to block
important legislation indefinitely, or to require that substantial com-
promises be made.36 Were it not for the Single Act, much of the legis-
lation contemplated in the Commission White Paper on the internal
market would have required unanimous consent in the Council.
A. Harmonization in Aid of the Internal Market
The other instruments provided by the Single European Act for
completing the internal market more closely mirror the Commission's
specific proposal that removal of physical, technical and fiscal barriers
to trade be achieved through a combination of simpler and more flexi-
ble harmonization procedures and a policy of mutual recognition of
national standards.37 As far as harmonization is concerned, article
100 of the original Treaty authorized the Council, acting by unani-
mous vote, to issue directives for the approximation of national legis-
lation or administrative measures which would directly affect the
establishment and functioning of the common market.38 Rather than
change the ground rules generally, the Single Act supplements the
existing harmonization procedure with a new one embodied in article
100A. Article 100A takes a more relaxed attitude toward harmoniza-
tion measures whose object is the establishment or functioning of the
34. See generally Edward, supra note 3, at 19-20; Pescatore, supra note 19, at 12-13.
Edward emphasizes the limited progress made on freedom of services. On the other hand, the
Council recently adopted a directive that, subject to a transitional period favoring the lesser
developed Member States, purports to complete the liberalization of capital movements within
the Community by 1990. Council Directive 88/361, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 178) 5
(1988).
35. See infra, Part V.
36. Hirsch, March intdrieur: une nouvelle impulsion grdce d l'acte unique?, 303 REVUE
DU MARCHE COMMUN [REV. M.C.] 1 (1987).
37. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
38. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100.
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internal market.39 In the first place, legislation under article 100A
may take the form of regulations or other measures, in addition to
directives, as permitted under article 100.40 More importantly, these
measures may be adopted in the Council by qualified majority vote,
rather than by the unanimous vote required under article 100.1
This sweeping extension of majority voting is significant in sev-
eral respects. Until the Single Act, the EEC Treaty generally pro-
vided for qualified majority only in limited fields, and then only for
the adoption of reasonably specific measures.42 Such is not the case
with harmonization under article 100A, a process potentially as broad
in scope as the internal market itself. Moreover, the unanimity
requirement frequently slowed the process of harmonizing technical
standards among the Member States since any one of the twelve
Member States could prevent or delay the adoption of legislation.
Qualified majority voting is specifically designed to facilitate decision-
making in the Council by eliminating the possibility of blocking
minorities.4 3
While greater use of qualified majority voting was among the
reformers' principal methods of promoting construction of the inter-
nal market, it was not their only method. The Commission White
Paper also proposed that new legislative techniques be devised that
39. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100A, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 18. However,
article 100A may be more limited in scope of application than article 100, whose use presup-
poses a direct effect upon the establishment or functioning of the common market, but does not
necessarily have that as its "object."
40. Id. One of the reasons for the extension was the poor record of certain states in
implementing harmonization directives, and the corresponding advantage of using regulations
that would be directly applicable in all Member States. Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 386.
Directives, in principle, provide greater flexibility to the Member States than regulations
because, according to article 189 of the EEC Treaty, they are binding in the Member States
only as to the result to be achieved and leave to national authorities a choice among form and
methods for their application. This is in contrast to regulations which are described as "bind-
ing in [their] entirety and directly applicable in all Member States." Although the Single Act
invites the use of instruments other than directives for harmonization purposes, a fourth decla-
ration directing the Commission to give priority to the use of directives whenever an amend-
ment of existing Member State legislation was necessary was included in the Final Act of the
intergovernmental conference that produced the Single European Act. Final Act, supra note
24, at 24 ("Declaration on Article IOOA of the EEC Treaty").
41. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. IOOA, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 18. Harmoni-
zation under article 100A is specifically required to take place "in cooperation with the Euro-
pean Parliament," a reference to the Single Act's new legislative procedure, discussed infra
Part V(B), as well as upon consultation of the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC).
By contrast, Article 100 does not require in all instances the consultation either of Parliament
or the ECOSOC. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100.
42. See generally J. DE RuYT, L'ACTE UNIQUE EUROPEEN 166 (1987).
43. Prior to the adoption of the Single Act, much of the harmonization legislation
designed to complete the internal market would have required the unanimous approval of the
Member States. Id. at 167.
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would make adopted legislation more effective, and that improved
administrative techniques be developed to enforce them. To this end,
the Commission and Council have adopted a new approach to
establishing Community norms that calls for mutual recognition of
national standards where appropriate, as opposed to Community har-
monization.' Moreover, when harmonization does occur, it will
cover only the essential requirements on any given matter and leave to
European standards bodies the task of establishing technical specifica-
tions.15 To ensure that these measures are better respected, the Com-
munity institutions have begun promoting regular mutual recognition
of various tests and certificates,4 6 and have established a system of
pre-adoption Commission review of most new national product stan-
dards.47 These procedural changes, like the Single Act's new qualified
44. Council Resolution of May 7, 1985 (85/C 136/01), 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 136)
1 (1985) [hereinafter Tech. Harmonization Res.]. See also Commission White Paper, supra note
21, at 6, 18-23. Mutual recognition of national standards refers to a process whereby each
Member State will admit products lawfully manufactured in other Member States, even
though manufactured or marketed on the basis of specifications that differ from those ordina-
rily required under its own law, provided the foreign standards broadly satisfy the legitimate
public interests of the admitting state. The Court of Justice has held that, in appropriate
circumstances, the mutual recognition of national standards is a Community law imperative,
even in the absence of harmonization measures on the product in question. Rewe-Zentral AG
v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir Branntwein, Case 120/78, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649,
[1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 494.
Reliance on the mutual recognition of national standards, at the expense of positive har-
monization, has a fashionable deregulatory flavor. In the long run, however, harmonization is
more apt to create a uniform regulatory environment and produce the full advantages of a
single market.
45. Tech. Harmonization Res., supra note 44, at 1. See also Commission White Paper,
supra note 21, at 18-19. Essential requirements, under the new harmonization approach, refer
to those aspects of any given legislative initiative that are deemed basic or fundamental to it,
rather than matters of detail. The key distinction is between principle and technical detail, and
the new approach will accordingly allow the institutions to deal with larger categories of prod-
ucts (i.e., to legislate more generically), since the technical matters on which specific kinds of
products will differ may be dealt with separately by European standards bodies. The most
important standards bodies are the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and the
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (known by its French acronym
CENELEC). By November 1988, four technical standards had been adopted either defini-
tively or provisionally by the Council on the basis of the new harmonization approach, with
others on the horizon. Commission Midterm Report, supra note 21, at 5.
46. See Waelbroeck, supra note 32, at 262-64. The directives themselves are now begin-
ning in greater number to provide that if a product bears a certain seal or certificate of the
Member State where it is produced-the accepted seals and certificates being specified in the
particular directive itself-then the product will be presumed to be in conformity with that
directive and will benefit from the mutual recognition principle. More specifically, the product
will be exempt from controls normally attaching before it can enter another Member State's
market.
47. See supra note 32 and infra note 65. By the end of 1987, the Commission had
already reviewed several hundred national measures under the system and required that many
of them be modified. First Commission Report, supra note 27, at 14; Second Commission
Report. supra note 27, at 21; Third Commission Report, supra note 27, at 21.
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majority voting provisions, are designed to promote simpler, swifter
and more certain dismantling of trade barriers. Unlike voting
formulas, however, these changes could be introduced without alter-
ing the Treaty framework.
Although largely procedural in character, article 1 OOA also regu-
lates certain substantive aspects of harmonization in the internal mar-
ket program which affect the balance between the Community's
interest in uniform economic regulation and the Member States'
desire to safeguard important national interests. A notable example is
the provision in article 100A(3) that Commission proposals for har-
monizing health, safety, and environmental and consumer protection
laws should seek to achieve "a high level of protection. '48 While not
requiring that the Community adopt the highest existing national
level of protection, article 100A(3) nevertheless enjoins the Commis-
sion to formulate harmonization standards that offer a significant
level of protection. The provision is designed to reassure those states
that traditionally have been more protective in these fields (for exam-
ple, Denmark and West Germany) that Community harmonization
measures enacted by qualified majority voting will not seriously
degrade their national standards. Admittedly, the vagueness of the
assurance renders it virtually unenforceable.49 Yet it is difficult to
48. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100A(3), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 18.
49. West Germany's proposal to the intergovernmental conference was that no harmoni-
zation measure affecting the stated values could be adopted without the assent of every Mem-
ber State whose national standards would thereby be lowered. See J. DE RuYT, supra note 42,
at 170. The West German proposal presented advantages from the point of view of enforce-
ment, but in effect conferred a limited right of veto.
For its part, the government of Denmark upon ratification filed an eighteenth declaration
to the Single European Act to the effect that article 100A permits a Member State to continue
to apply national provisions if Community standards do not adequately safeguard the working
or natural environment or other interests referred to in article 36 (see supra note 31), subject to
the proviso that the national provisions not constitute disguised protectionism. Final Act,
supra note 24, at 27 ("Declaration by the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark on Article
100A of the EEC Treaty" [hereinafter Danish Declaration]). Greece, Ireland and Portugal
also filed declarations in the Final Act expressing a need to safeguard certain national interests.
Id. at 26 ("Declaration by the Government of the Hellenic Republic on Article 8A of the EEC
Treaty" on exchange rate and transport policy); Id. at 27 ("Declaration by the Government of
Ireland on Article 57(2) of the EEC Treaty" on national insurance industry's need for protec-
tion); Id. ("Declaration by the Government of the Portuguese Republic on Articles 59, second
paragraph, and 84 of the EEC Treaty" on free movement of aliens providing services and
transport policy).
These Member State declarations, like those separately filed by the institutions, purport
unilaterally to modify or enter a reservation about a particular provision of the Single Act and
are probably of no legal effect. A different situation is presented by the first eleven declara-
tions, all of which were adopted by the intergovernmental conference itself at the time the
Single Act was signed and therefore may have interpretative value. For an alternative view,
see Toth, The Legal Status of the Declarations Annexed to the Single European Act, 23 Com-
MON MKT. L. REV. 803 (1986).
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imagine how a constitutional document such as the Single European
Act could offer more protection to national interests without restoring
the Member State veto. As will be discussed below, 50 the Act pro-
vides that Community legislation in the workplace safety and environ-
mental protection fields sets minimum standards only, thus leaving
individual states free to enact more stringent measures. However, to
extend this principle to all harmonization efforts in the health, safety,
and environmental and consumer protection fields would undermine
the idea of uniformity which is closely associated with harmonization.
The Single Act not only seeks to reassure those Member States
troubled by the prospect of lowered standards, but also those less eco-
nomically developed states that imagine themselves unable to meet
the standards that qualified majority decisionmaking will yield.
Again, the Act directs the Commission to consider the varied level of
economic development among the Member States when drafting its
proposals."1 If the Commission provides for derogations, they are to
be temporary and "cause the least possible disturbance to the func-
tioning of the common market."52 Both in allowing derogations and
in limiting their use, the Single Act reflects well-established Commu-
nity practices.53
B. Safeguards and Derogations in the New Harmonization
To assuage lingering Member State concerns that the process of
harmonization by qualified majority vote might ignore legitimate
national needs, 54 the Single Act's drafters introduced additional meas-
ures to safeguard these interests. As a first device, article 10OA(5)
expressly invites the Council "in appropriate cases" to equip its har-
monization measures with safeguard clauses allowing Member States
to protect their vital interests.5 The inclusion of such clauses actually
has been a common practice in the Community.5 6 However, this fea-
ture of the Single Act has been strongly criticized because it affords
50. See infra notes 137 & 145 and accompanying text.
51. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 8C, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 15.
52. Id. These conditions should dispel fears that the Single Act means to install what
has come to be called a "two-speed" Europe. See Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 375 (citing the
author's earlier article, How Flexible is Community Law? An Unusual Approach to the Concept
of "Two Speeds," 82 MICH. L. REv. 1274 (1984)).
53. Glaesner, supra note 16, at 296.
54. As insular nations, the United Kingdom and Ireland were keenly interested in
obtaining protection in the areas of plant and animal health. On the special concerns of Den-
mark, see Gulmann, The Single European Act: Some Remarks from a Danish Perspective, 24
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 31 (1987); Worre, Denmark at the Crossroads: The Danish Referen-
dum of 28 February 1986 on the EC Reform Package, 26 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 361 (1988).
55. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100A(5), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 18.
56. See Glaesner, supra note 16, at 297.
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Member States convenient opportunities to deviate from harmoniza-
tion measures enacted under article 100A, and tends by its very
nature to compromise the element of uniformity in harmonization.57
To prevent abuse of these clauses, the Single Act provides that Mem-
ber States may invoke a safeguard clause only on a provisional basis,
only in order to protect certain noneconomic national interests, and
only subject to "a Community control procedure. ' 58 In the final anal-
ysis, these safeguard clauses pose no greater threat to the integrity of
the internal market than do article 36 of the original treaty (the
regime governing permissible Member State restrictions on the free
movement of goods) and the voluminous case law on nontariff barri-
ers to trade that has emerged under that provision.
The real controversy surrounding article 100A has been gener-
ated not by the fairly traditional mechanism for meeting the needs of
minority states embodied in article 10OA(5), but by article 100A(4).7
This article enables Member States unilaterally to derogate from har-
monization measures adopted by a qualified majority of the Council
by applying nonconforming national laws, providing they do so in
order to protect either the "major needs" referred to in Treaty arti-
cle 3660 or the natural or workplace environment. 61 Article 100A(4)
presents real opportunities for protectionist abuse, especially insofar
as it leaves Member States free to decide for themselves, at least ini-
tially, whether deviation from Community standards is warranted.
Through a combination of political and legal review, the Single
Act attempts to minimize the risk that the Member States will abuse
57. Pescatore, supra note 19, at 12.
58. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100A(5), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 18. The
permissible bases parallel those set out in article 36 of the EEC Treaty concerning exceptions
to the rule eliminating quantitative restrictions on the free movement of goods or measures
having equivalent effect. For the grounds for exceptions, see supra note 31.
59. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100A(4), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 18.
60. See supra note 31.
61. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100A(4), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 18. The
unilateral derogation, being limited to harmonization done through qualified majority, has no
application to measures adopted under article 100. This seems logical, because the require-
ment of unanimity under article 100 should protect the interests of minority states. On the
other hand, the wording of article 100A(4) suggests that any Member State may make a unilat-
eral derogation from an article 100A harmonization measure. Thus, the privilege of making
such a derogation is not confined to a Member State that originally voted against the measure.
See Greenwood, Comment, Constitutional Reform in the EEC, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 1, 2
(1987). This view finds support in Court of Justice case law to the effect that a Member State
may seek annulment of a Council act under article 173 even though it was among those that
voted for the act in the first place. Italy v. Council, Case 166/78, 1979 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2575, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 770. Ehlermann, however, argues as a policy matter that
only those states that were outvoted at the time of a measure's adoption need or deserve the
opportunity to invoke article 100A(4) to avoid its effect. Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 394-95.
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article 10OA(4). Any Member State invoking article 10OA(4) must
notify the Commission of that fact, thereby enabling the Commission
to determine whether the derogation constitutes arbitrary discrimina-
tion or a disguised restriction on Member State trade,62 concepts
whose meaning the Court of Justice has amply clarified in the context
of article 36. If the Commission refuses to "confirm" the measure,
the Member State presumably may not enforce it, 63 although the
Commission's refusal should be open to challenge in the Court of Jus-
tice through the usual channels.64 It remains unclear whether a
Member State may apply nonconforming national measures under
article 100A(4) pending Commission review or upon the Commis-
sion's failure to act. The more reasonable view is that such measures
should not be applied until the Commission has actually confirmed
them.65 Thus, if national measures are applied prematurely, the Com-
mission or any other Member State may seek review directly in the
Court of Justice, without following the usual preliminary procedures
of articles 169 and 170.66 To evaluate the merits of a derogation, the
Commission and the Court will presumably apply the jurisprudence
of article 36, including the general principle of proportionality, 67 as
62. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100A(4), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 18.
63. Glaesner, The Single European Act: Attempt at an Appraisal, 10 FORDHAM J. INT'L
L. 446, 464 (1987).
64. Id. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 173. For a different and distinctly minor-
ity view on the necessity of Commission confirmation, see the Danish Declaration, supra note
49.
65. This interpretation would be in keeping with a directive enacted in 1983 on the sub-
ject of technical barriers to trade. Council Directive 83/189, supra note 32, at 8. See supra note
32 and accompanying text. This directive bars Member States from introducing new technical
standards without first notifying the Commission and thus giving the Commission and other
Member States an opportunity to object. Any such objection would require the state to delay
adoption of the draft measure until the Commission reaches a final determination. For sharply
contrasting views on the necessity of awaiting Commission confirmation under the new article
100A(4) procedure, compare Gulmann, supra note 54, at 38-39, with Flynn, How Will Article
100A(4) Work? A Comparison with Article 93, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 689, 698-701
(1987). See generally J. DE RuYT, supra note 42, at 172.
Ehlermann takes the view that paragraph 4 may only be invoked at a time prior to imple-
mentation of the harmonization measure. If that is correct, the question of the interim effec-
tiveness of nonconforming national measures does not arise. Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 395,
397-98.
66. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. IOOA(4), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 18. This
provision enables the Commission or any Member State to challenge measures taken under
article 100A directly in the Court of Justice without complying with the usual notice provi-
sions of Treaty articles 169 and 170.
67. See e.g., Denkavit Futtermittel GmbH v. Minister f'dr Ern~ihrung, Landwirtschaft
und Forsten des Landes N.R.W., Case 251/78, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3369, [1980] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 513. The principle of proportionality, applied in this context, should cause
the Commission and the Court to sustain a Member State derogation only to the extent the
latter is shown to be necessary for achieving the legitimate national needs invoked. See also
Glaesner, supra note 63, at 463.
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well as the more specific notion that Member State derogations are
unwarranted if existing measures reasonably protect an asserted
national interest.68
In sum, the drafters of the Single Act evidently included deroga-
tion provisions and safeguard clauses in article 100A in order to
secure Member State support for a regime of qualified majority voting
on much of the intetnal market legislation still needed. The drafters
also placed their confidence in the willingness and ability of the Com-
munity to curb Member State abuses of the article 100A privileges by
tolerating only narrowly tailored derogations that would satisfy the
Court's accepted standards of review. In these ways they sought to
accelerate legislative construction of the internal market without ulti-
mately jeopardizing respect for its most fundamental principles.
However, the framers' logic sacrifices somewhat the principle of
uniformity associated with harmonization. This situation could
prompt the Council to include a safeguard clause in harmonization
measures pursuant to article 10OA(5), even when it otherwise would
not do so, on the theory that the clause will bar Member States from
making unilateral derogations under article 10OA(4). 6 9 The Council
may also use article 100, the EEC Treaty's original harmonization
procedure, rather than article 100A. ° Although article 100 requires
unanimity for the adoption of harmonization directives, it does not
authorize Member States to take unilateral protective action. In the
final analysis, however, the framers were willing to place uniformity
at risk in exchange for increased qualified majority voting. It is also
possible that the framers viewed the Member States' acceptance of the
article 10OA(4) unilateral derogation procedure as an implied waiver
of their right to invoke the political veto provided for in the
68. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ftr Branntwein, Case 120/78, 1979
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 494. On this jurisprudence, see supra
note 44.
69. For endorsements of the stated theory, see Glaesner, supra note 16, at 297; Labouz,
L'Acte unique europoen, 3 REVUE QUEBECOISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.Q.D.A.] 133,
157-58 (1986). For the opposite view, see Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 399 n.59. Actually
neither the Single European Act nor its negotiating history reveals a clear intent either way.
According to one commentator, the coexistence of paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 100A is an
inadvertence, and the latter provision (which actually was negotiated earlier in time) ought to
have been discarded when the former was included. J. DE RuYT, supra note 42, at 171.
70. However, it has been argued that article 100, being a general harmonization provi-
sion, is not a proper basis for measures that are capable of adoption under the more specific
instrument of article 100A. See Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 382. In any case, it would be
wrong to assume that use of article 100 necessarily would yield the same harmonization mea-
sure as article 100A. As is well known, the process of reaching common consent often entails
compromises of substance. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Luxembourg Accords. 71
C. The Mutual Recognition of Standards
The Single European Act facilitates construction of the internal
market not only through legislation that actually harmonizes national
laws,72 but also through the closely related process of mutual recogni-
tion of standards.73 Article 100B of the amended Treaty directs the
Commission during the year 1992 to compile an inventory of all
national legislative or administrative measures which have not yet
been harmonized, but whose harmonization would advance the com-
pletion of the internal market.74 Upon proposal by the Commission
and using the same procedures as under article 100A, the Council
may decide anytime before the end of 1992 that each Member State
will be bound, with respect to specified matters within that inventory,
to treat the provisions in force in the other Member States as
equivalent to its own.75 Council decisions taken under article 100B
are intended to prevent a Member State from barring community
trade on account of noncompliance with domestic standards. In addi-
tion to giving the Council yet another legislative instrument for elimi-
nating nontariff barriers to trade, this mutual recognition of
standards, or constructive as opposed to actual harmonization of
national laws, should serve as a warning to the Member States that if
they do not vote to harmonize national measures under article 100A,
they may be bound to accept the national standards of every other
Member States as equivalent in effectiveness to their own. 76  The
71. For this view, see Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 392. On the Luxembourg Accords
and their future under the Single European Act, see infra Part V(C).
72. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
73. In its 1985 White Paper, the Commission advocated both harmonization and mutual
recognition as means to establish the internal market. Commission White Paper, supra note 21,
at 19, 21. Here, mutual recognition deals with substantive standards such as nontariffbarriers.
The process described in this part is one that can be resorted to when no actual harmonization
measure has been adopted. It is a means by which products can be declared in presumptive
conformity with the product standards of any state into which entry is sought, without any
actual harmonization measure on the subject ever having been adopted.
74. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100B(1), added by SEA, supra note I, art. 19.
75. Id. art. 100B(l), para. 2 & art. 100B(3). The Council will presumably be free to
select from the inventory those provisions it believes are suitable for mutual recognition of this
sort.
76. However, a fifth declaration annexed by the intergovernmental conference to the Sin-
gle European Act remarks that article 8C of the amended EEC Treaty, which contemplates
temporary derogations for Member States experiencing special difficulties, has general applica-
tion and is therefore applicable to measures taken under article 100B. FinalAct, supra note 24,
at 24 ("Declaration on Article 100B of the EEC Treaty"). In addition, article 100B(2)
expressly incorporates by analogy the unilateral derogation procedure set out in article
100A(4). EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 100A(4) & B(2), added by SEA, supra note 1, arts.
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Single Act's constructive harmonization procedure clearly is not as
potent an instrument as the automatic equivalence that the Commis-
sion originally sought.77 Affirmative action by the Council, if only in
the form of a declaration of equivalence, is still required. On the
other hand, article 100B presents the distinct advantage over article
100A of dispensing with what can be a long and arduous political
debate over the precise terms of a harmonization measure. It is an
imaginative and useful device, and probably capable of far-reaching
effects.
D. The Scope and Limits of the New Harmonization
The Member States ultimately chose to limit the scope of appli-
cation of articles 100A and 100B. For example, they excluded the
entire field of fiscal harmonization, 78 though they did commit them-
selves in principle to undertake whatever fiscal harmonization might
be necessary for completion of the internal market.79 Likewise, they
18 & 19. It seems reasonable to assume that safeguard clauses, such as article 100A(5) invites,
are also welcome under article 100B.
77. The Commission originally proposed that if harmonization of national laws had not
been accomplished by the end of 1992, each Member State at that time would become auto-
matically bound, without any action by the Council, to treat the relevant provisions of every
other Member State affecting the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital as
equivalent to its own. See J. DE RuYT, supra note 42, at 158; Jacqu6, L'Acte unique europden,
22 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN [REV. TRIM. DR. EUR.] 575, 598 (1986).
Among the drawbacks of that approach is the incentive it might give to less protective states to
resist positive efforts at harmonization in the expectation that, starting in 1993, their stan-
dards, however low, would be deemed equally protective as those of the other Member States.
Article 47 of the Draft Treaty of European Union had specified a series of internal market
deadlines: two years for provisions affecting persons and goods, five years for those affecting
services, and ten for those affecting capital. The drafters may have intended to give those
deadlines direct effect, but they were not explicit. Draft Treaty, supra note 5, art. 47.
78. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100A(2), added by SEA, supra 1, art. 18. The Com-
mission initially proposed that any fiscal harmonization necessary to the establishment or func-
tioning of the internal market be a proper subject of harmonization by qualified majority, but
the Member State reaction was uniformly negative, mostly on account of traditional state sov-
ereignty in matters of national economic and budgetary policy. See J. DE RuYT, supra note 42,
at 164; Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 380-81.
79. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 99, amended by SEA, supra note 1, art. 17. Article
99, as amended, requires the Council (voting unanimously upon Commission proposal, and
after consulting the European Parliament) to take the necessary harmonization measures on
turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation before the end of 1992. The
amendment's deletion from article 99 of its original reference to articles 100 and 101 implies
that the procedures set out in article 99 are now exclusive. As far as article 100 goes, this is
not a serious loss since it too requires unanimity. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
Article 101, on the other hand, would have allowed the Council by qualified majority vote to
take action to eliminate differences among national laws that cause distortions in competition.
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 101. To the extent that it bars resort to article 101 for purposes
of fiscal harmonization, the Single Act makes the process more difficult.
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declared that measures concerning the free movement of persons8"
and the treatment of employees81 would not be subject to actual
or constructive harmonization by qualified majority.82  Finally, the
Member States reserved the right to take 'unilateral measures to con-
trol immigration from third countries, and to combat terrorism,
crime, drug trafficking and illicit trade in art.83 While these exclu-
sions and reservations may seem needless in view of the more general
safeguards already attached to articles 100A and 100B, they should
not be viewed with alarm. Assuming that the Single Act's introduc-
tion of new instruments for completion of the internal market neither
prejudices the application of unamended provisions of the EEC
Treaty84 nor weakens the force of existing common market commit-
ments,8 5 then these limitations do not seriously detract from the Sin-
gle Act's commitment to create a Europe without internal frontiers.
Other aspects of the new internal market program, such as the
safeguard clause and derogation provisions built into article 100A and
the designation of 1992 as the deadline for completion of the market,
seem more problematic when judged by their continuity with estab-
lished principles of Community law.86 However, even these features
80. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100A(2), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 18. Exclu-
sion of the free movement of persons was prompted by a desire to preserve national sover-
eignty in the handling of terrorism, international crime and international drug trafficking.
Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 366-67.
Despite this general exclusion, the Single Act specifically makes certain aspects of the free
movement of persons subject to regulation by qualified majority instead of unanimous vote, as
was previously the case. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 57(2) & 59, para. 2, amended by
SEA, supra note 1, arts. 16(2) & (3).
81. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. IOOA(2), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 18. The
reasons for and dimensions of this exclusion, apparently sought in the negotiations by the
United Kingdom, are unclear. J. DE RuYT, supra note 42, at 169.
82. The exclusion of these matters from the field of harmonization by qualified majority
vote means that any regulation must be based on other available treaty provisions (including
articles 100 and 235 of the EEC Treaty).
83. Final Act, supra note 24, at 25 ("General declaration on Articles 13 to 19 of the
Single European Act"). See generally Glaesner, supra note 16, at 292-93. However, in the
thirteenth declaration the Member States pledged to cooperate in these same efforts. Final Act,
supra note 24, at 26 ("Political declaration by the Governments of the Member States on the
free movement of persons").
84. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 8A, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 13.
85. See generally Brown, Reforms in the EEC's Legislative Process: The Single European
Act and its Practical Implications, 32 J.L. Soc. SCOTLAND 336, 337 (1987); Ehlermann, supra
note 27, at 369; Glaesner, supra note 16, at 292; Jacqu6, supra note 77, at 598.
86. For example, the Court of Justice has ruled that article 36 of the EEC Treaty may
not be invoked by a Member State to avoid the direct effects of the free movement principle
stated in article 30 once a relevant harmonization measure has intervened. Denkavit Fut-
termittel GmbH v. Minister fiir Erniihrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten des Landes N.R.W.,
Case 251/78, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3369, 3388-89, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 513, 536-
37. Article 100A(4) plainly compromises this principle when it permits Member States to
claim derogations from harmonization measures on certain noneconomic grounds. EEC
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of the Single Act ultimately do not impair the acquis com-
munautaire.87 As previously indicated,"8 the framers of the Single
Act viewed the safeguard and derogation provisions of article 100A as
narrow concessions required in order to win the Member States'
acceptance of wider qualified majority voting. The 1992 deadline, on
the other hand, was not intended to prolong the original transition
period for accomplishing the program set out as such in the EEC
Treaty,8 9 and should not be interpreted as doing so. The deadline was
also not intended to justify a failure to give direct effect to Treaty
provisions and to secondary Community legislation where appropri-
ate under settled Court of Justice jurisprudence. 9° On the contrary,
the Single Act assumes the validity of these principles and concen-
trates instead on facilitating the process by which the Community can
adopt the legislation needed to eliminate the remaining nontariff bar-
riers to trade. This is not to suggest that the Court's integrationist
jurisprudence in the free movement area9' has become outmoded.
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100(4), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 18. However, it does not
alter the otherwise general rule barring recourse to article 36 to avoid the direct effect of article
30 once harmonization has occurred. See generally J. DE RuYT, supra note 42, at 174.
87. The term "acquis communautaire" refers to the assembled body of legal principles,
largely developed by the European Court of Justice, that help ensure the integrity, supremacy
and effectiveness of the Community legal order. See J. BOULOUIS, DROIT INSTITUTIONNEL
DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES 152 (1984), and cases cited therein.
88. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
89. See Murphy, supra note 3, at 252-53. But see McElhenny, The United Kingdom,
Ireland and the Single European Act: Its Origins and Implications, 39 No. IRE. LEGAL Q. 54,
61-62 (1988).
90. Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 372, 400-01. Ehlermann makes special reference to the
direct effectiveness of articles 30, 52 and 59 of the EEC Treaty. But see McElhenny, supra note
89, at 54.
A certain amount of confusion has been caused by the third declaration of the Luxem-
bourg intergovernmental conference to the effect that expiration of the December 31, 1992
deadline set out in the Single Act is to be without automatic legal effect. Final Act, supra note
24, at 24 ("Declaration on Article 8A of the EEC Treaty," para. 2). This declaration simply
guards against the unlikely circumstance that the Court of Justice or Member State courts will
extend the direct effects doctrine, see supra note 30, to the Single Act's call for adoption by the
end of 1992 of the measures required to complete the internal market. It leaves responsibility
for timely completion of the internal market in the hands of the appropriate political institu-
tions.
On the other hand, the internal market section of the Single Act preserves the direct effect
that may be fairly attributed to the various provisions of the original Treaty under Court of
Justice case law, when it states that it is "without prejudice to the other provisions of [the]
Treaty." EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 8A, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 13. In addition,
the Single Act leaves open the possibility of an action in the Court of Justice against the
Council under article 175 of the Treaty for its failure to act. Thus, to say the internal market
commitment is without legal effect is something of an overstatement.
91. This jurisprudence is most accurately reflected in the Cassis de Djon line of cases.
See e.g., Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung rfr Branntwein, Case 120/78, 1979
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 494; Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville,
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Whatever the volume of Community legislation that intervenes, there
will be occasion and need to give direct effect to article 30 and other
fundamental free market provisions of the EEC Treaty. But if the
new legislative instruments work as planned, this jurisprudence will
need to be relied upon less often to translate common market man-
dates into common market realities.
The Commission's several progress reports on completion of the
internal market suggest that the program thus far has met with quali-
fied success. 92 By the end of 1988, the Commission had submitted
proposals for over ninety percent of the measures set out in its 1985
White Paper, and the Council had adopted about one-third of the leg-
islative program envisaged. 93 Although Community institutions (par-
ticularly the Council, and to a much lesser extent Parliament) are still
behind schedule, and in some cases have produced less progressive
legislation than the Commission had contemplated, 94 in many areas
they are not far from original goals. Significantly, the Commission
has concluded that the generally improved performance of the institu-
tions in 1987 and 1988 when compared to the two previous years95 is
due in part to the greater use of qualified majority voting resulting
from the Single European Act's entry into force in mid-1987.96 It is
probably no coincidence that fiscal harmonization, the principal area
in the internal market program that remains subject to a rule of una-
Case 8/74, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 837, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 436. On this jurispru-
dence, see supra notes 44 & 68 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 27. The November 1988 midterm report described progress as satis-
factory overall, but "patchy." Commission Midterm Report, supra note 21, at 5. The areas
showing the most positive results at midterm include harmonization of technical standards,
free movement of certain services (notably insurance and banking) and of capital, development
of a single transport market, liberalization in public procurement, and the mutual recognition
of professional qualifications and diplomas. In several of these areas, especially in the last two
named, progress is still only partial.
For areas in which the Commission considers the results to date to be unsatisfactory, see
infra notes 94, 97 & 98 and accompanying text.
93. Commission Midterm Report, supra note 21, at 4. The figure for Council action rises
to forty percent if the Council's adoption of provisional measures, in the form of a "common
position," is included. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
94. The clearest examples are the measures taken to promote the free movement of per-
sons across Member State borders. See Commission Midterm Report, supra note 21, at 23.
95. The Commission's first two progress reports revealed a significant backlog in the
proposal and especially the enactment of internal market legislation. The third and midterm
reports, both issued in 1988, offered more positive assessments. See supra notes 21 & 27.
96. Although the Commission credits qualified majority voting with advancing the inter-
nal market program, it is somewhat more guarded in its assessment of the Single Act's new
parliamentary cooperation procedure for the enactment of legislation, discussed infra Part
V(B), and highly disappointed by the Council's failure to increase delegations to the Commis-
sion as promised by the Act. See infra notes 185-186 and accompanying text.
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nimity in the Council, has shown little progress. 97 On the other hand,
progress has also been slow in certain areas subject to qualified major-
ity decisionmaking.98 This should serve as a reminder that institu-
tional modifications alone do not assure quick success on difficult and
important policy questions. Throughout its reports, the Commission
has reiterated the fairly obvious point that timely completion of the
internal market will require not only a general political will favoring
the change, but also a readiness on the part of the Member States to
translate that political will into "positive tangible results." 99 More-
over, establishing the internal market in practice as well as in law will
require a better record of compliance with Council directives and
Court of Justice pronouncements than certain Member States have
shown in the past.'0°
By focusing on the programmatic task of completing the internal
market, the drafters of the Single European Act have eschewed grand
strategies for political reform, such as Parliament's Draft Treaty, and
adopted instead the wise and time-honored strategy of building
Europe through concrete functional achievements. This choice
reflects the Member States' unreadiness to support reforms that are
based overtly on political as opposed to economic integration. It is
true that the mechanisms adopted by the Single Act for furthering
European economic integration fall short of those the Commission
had wanted.'' Nevertheless, the centerpiece of Community reform,
however much it has been shaped to satisfy Member State preoccupa-
tions, remains the internal market and the instruments for achieving
it.
Alongside its internal market agenda, the Single Act advances
two other goals both of which reflect a distinctly more political
approach to Community-building: an expansion of Community com-
petence and institutional reform. The evaluation of these efforts
which follows demonstrates that, despite the attention devoted to
97. Commission Midterm Report, supra note 21, at 7, 9.
98. As of 1988, significant lack of progress was reported in the areas of plant and animal
health, elimination of border formalities affecting the free movement of persons, and the right
of residence of nonworking Community nationals in all Member States. Id. at 7-8. Progress
reportedly has also been slow in establishing Community patents and trademarks. Id. at 21.
99. See, e.g., Second Commission Report, supra note 27, at 24.
100. The Commission's strategy of relying more heavily than before on the Member
States' duty of mutual recognition of reasonably equivalent national standards (see supra note
44 and accompanying text) only heightens the importance of their faithful compliance with
Community law principles.
101. Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 403-04. Most disappointing to the Commission were
the unilateral derogation option, the exclusions from qualified majority harmonization, the
denial of legal effect to the 1992 deadline, and the nonautomatic character of harmonization
under article 100B.
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them on the face of the Act and in the lengthy discussions preceding
it, they are ultimately secondary in importance to the completion of
the internal market.
I1. THE PERIPHERY: NEW COMPETENCES FOR THE
COMMUNITY
Judging by the rubrics that it adds to the Treaty of Rome, the
Single European Act seems to represent an important expansion in
Community competence. The pertinent amendments expressly em-
power the institutions to take action in the spheres of economic and
monetary policy, 10 2 regional development, 03 worker safety and
health, 04 protection and improvement of the environment, 10 5 and sci-
entific and technological development. 106 With the exception of mon-
etary policy, the drafters of the original Treaty did not meaningfully
address these policy areas. In bringing these matters within the
Treaty's purview, the Member States appear finally to have commit-
ted themselves to a significant expansion of Community-wide social
and economic policymaking.
Upon closer examination, however, the impression of an en-
larged and strengthened Community competence proves somewhat
misleading. In the first place, the drafters of the Single Act did not
extend the Community sphere as broadly as discussions preceding the
Act suggested they might.0 7 Moreover, the provisions they did add
are of questionable significance. In certain areas, the Single Act lends
a programmatic and procedural detail that will be instructive to the
institutions. However, on others it simply ratifies assumptions that
the Commission and Council had long made. about the scope of the
Community's implied powers. In a few respects, the Single Act may
actually make it less probable that the institutions will act on the mat-
ters addressed.
In the final analysis, the Single European Act contributes to
action within the new Community spheres mostly as an incident of
the Act's other initiatives. For example, by expanding the rule of
qualified majority voting in the Council, the Single Act enhances the
102. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 102A, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 20.
103. Id. art. 130A-E, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 23.
104. Id. art. llSA-B, added by SEA, supra note 1, art 21.
105. Id. art. 130R-T, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 25.
106. Id. art. 130F-Q, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 24.
107. The Dooge Committee Report, supra note 18, had called for express Community
competence in such areas as energy policy, cultural life, unemployment policy and labor rela-
tions. The Commission recommended consumer protection as a sphere of Community activ-
ity. Commission White Paper, supra note 21, at 8. France favored a broadly conceived
"European social space" (un espace social europden). See Jacqu6, supra note 77, at 602.
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likelihood of progress in these areas, as in others. In most cases, the
only bases for action previously available in these fields were the EEC
Treaty's article 235 (the implied powers provision) and article 100
(the harmonization provision), both of which required the Council's
unanimous consent. 108 However, the turn toward qualified majority
voting clearly has more to do with the Single Act's strategy of advanc-
ing the internal market through simpler harmonization, 10 9 and its
strategy of institutional reform, 110 than with a conscious shift in poli-
cymaking competence from the national to the Community level.
Viewed as a whole, the new substantive chapters added to the EEC
Treaty more closely resemble a set of legislative priorities than a con-
stitutional expansion of federal power.
A. Economic and Monetary Cooperation
The Treaty of Rome originally contemplated not only the crea-
tion of a common market but also the progressive approximation of
Member State economic policies and the harmonious development of
economic activities within the Community."' It specified coordina-
tion of monetary policy as one means of achieving these objectives." 2
Nevertheless, compared to the treatment accorded other Community
policies, the Treaty provisions on economic and monetary policy were
conspicuously vague, both substantively and procedurally. In reality,
a proper transfer to the Community of legislative competence in the
monetary sphere has yet to occur. As a result, virtually all tangible
progress made in the sphere of monetary policy-whether the launch-
ing of the European Monetary System [EMS]," 3 the creation of the
108. After the Single European Act, the implied powers provision in article 235 is proba-
bly no longer available as a basis for Community action in furtherance of the internal market.
This is so because it should only be applied when no other Treaty article specifically provides
the Community with the legislative authority to achieve its objectives. EEC Treaty, supra note
2, art. 235 ("If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain ... objectives of the
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers .. "). It may also be that
article 100, the Treaty's general harmonization provision, has no application to matters that
fall under article 100A, the Single Act's more specific instrument for harmonization in aid of
the internal market. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
110. See infra Part V.
111. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2.
112. Id. art. 105(2).
113. Resolution of the European Council of Dec. 5, 1978, 11 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 12)
10 (1978) [hereinafter EMS Res.]. The action taken at Brussels built directly upon the conclu-
sions of an earlier European Council meeting of July 1978 held at Bremen. The Results of the
European Council in Bremen, 11 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) 17-18 (1978). The European
Monetary System (EMS) refined an earlier program of monetary coordination ("the serpent in
the tunnel") agreed upon among the Ministers of Finance and the governors of the central
banks of the original six Member States in the early 1970's. European Monetary System, 11
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European Currency Unit [ECU],"I4 or the various agreements among
central banks on the operation of these systems' '5-has occurred
through the intergovernmental political process. Even the institu-
tionalization of these accomplishments within the Community legal
framework, initially scheduled for 1980, was deferred by the Euro-
pean Council until an unspecified future date.' 16 For its part, the
more ambitious enterprise of a comprehensive economic and mone-
tary union, first announced in 1969, yielded some early results but
ultimately failed to materialize. 17
As the new caption "Cooperation in Economic and Monetary
Policy""' 8 suggests, the Single European Act does not greatly alter
this state of affairs. The sole article added under this caption to the
EEC Treaty calls upon the Member States to cooperate further in
aligning their economic and monetary policies and to continue to
"respect existing powers in this field." 119 The only reference to an
economic and monetary union in the Act is found in the preamble, in
predictably vague and aspirational terms. 2 ° Accordingly, the Single
Act's long-awaited reform of Community foundations actually leaves
essentially intact the preexisting framework of intergovernmental
cooperation with regard to economic and monetary policy.
The Member States' decision to introduce a chapter into the
EEC Treaty specifically devoted to economic and monetary policy,
while neither committing themselves to any new initiatives nor
empowering the institutions to legislate a Community policy proper,
reflects the profound differences of view among the states and the
institutions regarding the Community's role in these sensitive
domains.' 2' The clearest sign of this division appears in a provision of
BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) 8 (1978). The EMS, like its predecessor, is an essentially volun-
tary undertaking. Member States are free not to participate (and some have chosen not to),
while non-Member States may be allowed to take part.
114. EMS Res., supra note 113, at 10.
115. A European Monetary Cooperation Fund had previously been established within
the Community legal framework. Council Regulation 907/73, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
89) 2 (1973) [hereinafter Reg 907/73]. Later, it was authorized to use the new European
Currency Unit. Council Regulation 3180/78, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 379) 1 (1978).
116. Building the Community, 13 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 12) 30 (1980).
117. See J. DR RuYT, supra note 42, at 180-81.
118. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, pt. 3, tit. II, ch. 1, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 20.
119. Id. art. 102A(1).
120. SEA, supra note 1, preamble, para. 8 ("Whereas... the Heads of State or of Gov-
ernment approved the objective of the progressive realization of economic and monetary
union.").
121. For example, the Commission and Belgium sought in the Single European Act to
grant the Community legislative competence over monetary and economic policy, to incorpo-
rate the EMS and other achievements into the Community law system, and to commit the
institutions to an economic and monetary union. Germany and the United Kingdom, for
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the new chapter on economic and monetary policy which states that
no institutional changes should occur in these fields without an
amendment to the EEC Treaty formally authorizing them. 22 Absent
such an amendment, any significant development in this sphere will
have to proceed, as in the past, along avenues of Member State coop-
eration, joint action among central banks, and the like. The scope of
this provision is far from clear. 123 Ironically, its ultimate effect, if and
when Treaty amendments are actually made to permit future institu-
tional developments, may be to bring the whole sphere of economic
and monetary policy squarely within the Treaty framework.124
B. Regional Policy
The existence of gross disparities in economic development
among the Community's various regions has long been a Community
concern. The Single European Act, in keeping with its emphasis on
creating a unified Community-wide market, makes elimination of
these disparities an express Community function. Under the banner
of "economic and social cohesion," the name given to the Commu-
nity's new regional development policy,' 25 the Single Act reaffirms the
intent of "reducing disparities between the various regions and the
backwardness of the least-favored regions." 126
different reasons, were strongly opposed. On these differences, see J. DE RuYT, supra note 42,
at 178.
122. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 102A, para. 2, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 20.
Britain in particular was fearful of being drawn into a monetary union or a Community-based
system of central banks. See Lodge, supra note 20, at 208. Under a provision such as article
102A, it would not have been possible for the Council to have created the European Monetary
Fund, as it did on the basis of article 235 of the EEC Treaty in its Regulation of April 3, 1973.
Reg 907/73, supra note 115. For this reason, some commentators consider the Single Act's
provisions on monetary cooperation "regressive in spirit if not in content." Murphy, supra
note 3, at 262. See also Glaesner, supra note 63, at 454.
Article 102A also requires consultation of the Monetary Committee and the Committee
of Governors of the Central Banks before any such institutional changes are made. EEC
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 102A, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 20. The Monetary Commit-
tee, established pursuant to article 105(2) of the EEC Treaty, is a standing advisory body
whose function is to review the monetary and financial situation of the Community and the
Member States, including their payments systems, and to advise the Council and Commission
on those matters. Each Member State, as well as the Commission, appoints two members.
123. The Commission and the Council President filed a nineteenth declaration in the
Final Act of the intergovernmental conference stating that the new Treaty provisions on mone-
tary capacity are "without prejudice to the possibility of further development within the frame-
work of the existing powers." Final Act, supra note 24, at 27 ("Declaration by the Presidency
and the Commission on the monetary capacity of the Community").
124. See J. DE RUYT, supra note 42, at 187.
125. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, pt. 3, tit. V, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 23 ("Policy
of the Community").
126. Id. art. 130A. The preamble of the original Treaty itself expressed a desire to
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In fact, significant regional development initiatives had preceded
the Single European Act. For example, the European Social Fund
and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, both
provided for in the original Treaty,127 exerted an indirect impact on
regional policy. By the 1970's, due to increasing regional economic
disparities, the Member States had become convinced of the need for
more direct action. Accordingly, in 1975 the Council used its implied
powers under the EEC Treaty to establish the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) designed to address the problem more
directly.128 Out of caution, the Council placed the Fund on provi-
sional footing, financed it only modestly and, most importantly,
refrained from providing for it directly in the Treaty. 29 However,
subsequent improvements in financing and approach have helped turn
the ERDF into a more effective force for regional development. As
recently as 1984, the Council replaced the ERDF's governing statute
with one that encourages comprehensive regional development plan-
ning (rather than project by project action) and allows the Comm-
ission to establish priorities in expenditures. 3 ° The creation of
programs to aid current and prospective Mediterranean Member
States had demonstrated the importance of a strong Commission
hand in rationalizing the Community's regional policy as financed by
the ERDF and the other structural funds.
The Single Act's provisions on economic and social cohesion
merely ratify these developments. They call upon the Community to
use the structural funds (including the ERDF, whose existence is now
recognized in the Treaty' 31), as well as the European Investment
reduce regional economic differences and to promote the less-favored regions. EEC Treaty,
supra note 2, preamble, para. 5.
127. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 40(4), 123-128.
128. Council Regulation 724/75, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 73) 1 (1975). The Euro-
pean Regional Development Fund was created with a stated intent "to correct the principal
regional imbalances within the Community." Id. at 2. Its functions were primarily to provide
grants for public and private investment in infrastructure and for industrial, service and craft
activities. Fund monies, fixed as part of the regular budget negotiations, were allocated
according to national quotas upon application by the states. The Fund is administered by the
Commission, assisted by a Fund Committee and a Regional Policy Committee. See Murphy,
Towards a More Fairly Balanced and Better Quality of Life, in COMMISSION OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW 487, 492-93 (1983).
129. The Council instituted the Fund on the basis of a regulation adopted under the
Community's implied powers. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 235.
130. Council Regulation 1787/84, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1984). For a
positive account of the changes, see Croxford, Wise & Chalkley, The Reform of the European
Regional Development Fund: A Preliminary Assessment, 26 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 25
(1987).
131. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130C, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 23. A new
article 130E specifically directs that expenditures from the European Regional Development
Fund be decided upon by the Council acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the
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Bank, to promote economic and social cohesion. To this end, the Act
directs the Council to make those institutional changes to the funds as
may be needed to advance regional development in an effective and
concerted way. 132
The new Treaty chapter on economic and social cohesion
unquestionably demonstrates the Member States' desire to advance
the funding of regional development and to give such funding a more
solid legal basis. The formal recognition of regional development as a
Community goal, and of the ERDF as an instrument to that end,
represents sound policy, particularly in light of the Community's lat-
est enlargements, its attachment to the internal market, and its con-
cern for states whose economic interests may be injured through
qualified majority decisionmaking. However, given its programmatic
and institutional continuity with past practices, the Single Act's treat-
ment of "economic and social cohesion" cannot plausibly be regarded
as a major reform strategy.
C. Worker Health and Safety
Worker health and safety under the Single European Act has
become a matter of Community competence, although as a subject it
is much narrower than the social policy rubric under which the Act
places it. A new article 11 8A of the EEC Treaty specifically contem-
plates the Council's adoption by qualified majority of directives that
will harmonize and at the same time improve conditions in the work-
ing environment. 133 Accordingly, in regulating the workplace, the
Commission and according to a new parliamentary cooperation procedure, discussed infra
Part V(B). The operations of the other structural funds remain unchanged. EEC Treaty,
supra note 2, art. 130E, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 23.
132. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130D, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 23. On such
matters, the Council acts unanimously upon a proposal of the Commission after consulting the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. Within the one-year period
provided by the Single Act, the Council had adopted the text contemplated by article 130D.
Council Regulation 2052/88, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (NO. L 185) 9 (1988). Regulations have
since been adopted for implementing Regulation 2052/88 with respect to the different struc-
tural funds. See, e.g., Council Regulation 4253/88, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 1 (1988)
(coordination of activities of the different funds between themselves and with the European
Investment Bank); Council Regulation 4254/88, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 374) 15 (1988)
(European Regional Development Fund); Council Regulation 4255/88, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 374) 21 (1988) (European Social Fund); Council Regulation 4256/88. 31 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 374) 25 (1988) (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund).
133. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. I ISA, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 21. The
adoption of such directives also entails consultation of the Economic and Social Committee
and use of the new parliamentary cooperation procedure, discussed infra Part V(B).
On December 21, 1987, the Council, upon proposal by the Commission, adopted a resolu-
tion setting out a general framework for issuing workplace health and safety directives under
article 118A. Council Resolution of Dec. 21, 1987 (88/C28/01), 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
28) 1 (1988). For the underlying Commission document, see Commission Communication
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Council is no longer confined to using Treaty article 100, which
requires unanimity in the Council, or Treaty article 100A, which
requires that legislation adopted under it bear a connection to the
internal market. Moreover, worker health and safety is singled out as
a field of social policy whose importance warrants actual Community
legislation rather than the mere recommendation and coordination
functions that the EEC Treaty generally assigns to the Commission in
the social domain. 134
By treating occupational health and safety as a proper subject of
harmonization, and by easing the process through qualified majority
voting, the Act's drafters appealed to the Community institutions to
address this policy area more effectively. However, the Single Act
specifically requires that directives in this field be implemented gradu-
ally and with due regard for local conditions. 135  Moreover, in no
event may worker health and safety legislation prejudice the
development of small and medium-sized businesses.1 36 The Act also
expressly preserves the right of Member States to maintain or intro-
duce more stringent occupational health and safety requirements if
they wish.13 7 Clearly, the Member States' enthusiasm for Commu-
nity-wide regulation of workplace health and safety did not cause
them to set aside entirely their fears that such regulation might prove
either excessively or insufficiently protective.
D. Environmental Protection
The Single Act's introduction of a chapter on environmental pro-
tection seems entirely natural considering the dramatic increase in
concern for the environment since the adoption of the EEC Treaty
over thirty years ago. The Member States had long before recognized
the importance of protecting the environment on a Community-wide
(88/C 28/02), 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 28) 3 (1988). For an example of a directive
adopted under article 118A, see Council Directive 88/364, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 179) 44
(1988) (banning certain activities and chemical agents in the workplace).
134. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 118. However, the new article 11SB maintains the
Commission's traditional role as "facilitator." Id. art. 1 18B, added by SEA, supra note 1, art.
22. It calls upon the Commission to promote labor-management dialogue on a European scale
and, conceivably, Community-wide bargaining agreements. In fact, article 118B only ratifies
existing Commission practices.
135. Id. art. 118A(2), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 21.
136. Id. art. 118(A)(2), para. 2. The Final Act's seventh declaration, made by the inter-
governmental conference at West Germany's request, renounces any intent to discriminate
unjustifiably against employees of small or medium-sized businesses in setting minimum health
and safety requirements. Final Act, supra note 24, at 25 ("Declaration on Article 11 8A(2) of
the EEC Treaty"). The proviso favoring small and medium-sized firms had been included
originally to meet British concerns.
137. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 1 18A(3), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 21.
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scale. 13  Since the early 1970's, the Council had used the EEC
Treaty's implied powers and harmonization provisions to enact envi-
ronmental legislation.139  The Single Act essentially ratifies the
Community's present involvement in environmental policy, while
placing it on a firmer and more independent footing. The amended
Treaty's statement of environmental policy objectives plainly demon-
strates that the Community may act broadly in the interest of envi-
ronmental protection without any demonstrated nexus to the
establishment or functioning of the internal market."4
These developments would ordinarily have foreshadowed more
deliberate and intensive Community regulation of the environment in
the future. However, the Member States were sufficiently troubled by
the potentially far-reaching economic consequences of such regulation
that they declined to make the same transition from unanimous to
qualified majority voting in the Council that was made in other areas
brought within the Community's sphere by the Single Act. Except
where the Council expressly provides for decisions to be taken by a
qualified majority vote,'41 all environmental action by the Community
requires the unanimous consent of the Council.'42 Perhaps as a
138. Jacqu6, supra note 77, at 604.
139. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 100, 235. Pursuant to a 1972 summit conference
decision, The First Summit Conference of the Enlarged Community, 5 BULL. EUR. COMM.
(No. 10) 20 (1972), committing the Community to the development of an environmental pol-
icy, the Community adopted three successive environmental action programs in 1973, 1977
and 1983. Council Resolution of Nov. 22, 1973, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 1 (1973);
Council Resolution of May 17, 1977, 20 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. C 139) 1 (1977); Council
Resolution of Feb. 7, 1983, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 46) 1 (1983). A new action program
on the environment for the years 1987 to 1992 has been adopted by the Council under the
Single Act. Council Resolution of Oct. 19, 1987 (87/C 328/01), 30 O.J. EUR. CoMm. (No. C
328) 1 (1987).
140. The Community may act "(i) to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the
environment; (ii) to contribute towards protecting human health; (iii) to ensure a prudent and
rational utilization of natural resources." EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130R(1), added by
SEA, supra note 1, art. 25. Article 130R(2) directs that, in advancing these goals, the Com-
munity should favor (1) the taking of preventive measures, (2) the correction of environmental
damage at the source, and (3) the practice of requiring that polluters pay for environmental
cleanup. Id. art. 130R(2). These principles are not new to the Community. Article 130R(3)
further specifies factors the Community should consider before taking action relating to the
environment. These factors include technological feasibility, regional differences in environ-
mental conditions, cost-benefit calculations, and developmental needs of the Community and
its regions. Id. art. 130R(3).
141. Id. art. 130S, para. 2.
142. Id. art. 130S, para. 1. Since unanimous voting remains the general rule for environ-
mental protection measures, this is not a field in which the new parliamentary cooperation
procedure of Community legislation, discussed infra Part V(B), has been made applicable.
That procedure presupposes qualified majority voting. On the other hand, consultation of the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee will normally be required.
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130S, para. 1, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 25.
Insistence on a single-state veto did not come only from those Member States fearing
1989]
COLUM'IBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
partial corrective to this procedural rule, the Single Act expressly
instructs the institutions to take environmental protection values into
consideration as a component of the Community's other policies. 143
Although this proviso may appear to be simply another indication of
the environment's privileged position on the Community agenda, it
actually should permit the institutions to use the more relaxed voting
rules applicable to other Community policies, such as harmonization
in aid of the internal market, whenever they seek to advance environ-
mental protection as a component of that other policy rather than as
an end in itself.
The Member States' ambivalence toward facilitating Community
action on the environment is also reflected in the special preemption
provisions included in the Treaty's environmental chapter. The
Treaty empowers the institutions to adopt environmental legislation
only where the Community's environmental policy objectives "can be
attained better at [the] Community level than at the level of the indi-
vidual Member States.""' It also expressly preserves the right of
individual states in this sphere, as in worker health and safety, to
maintain or introduce national measures that are more protective
than those established by the Community.'45
Unfortunately, the Single Act's acceptance of environmental pro-
tection as a component of other policies and its treatment of Com-
munity competence as subsidiary to national competence in the
environmental policy field may prove problematic. In many cases, the
policies too protective of the environment or otherwise too costly. West Germany advocated a
veto specifically in favor of those states whose environmental standards risked being lowered
by Community action. See Jacqu6, supra note 77, at 608. See also supra note 49 and accompa-
nying text.
143. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130R(2), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 25.
144. Id. art. 130R(4). This "subsidiarity" principle has been criticized as "clearly a step
backwards," considering the wider possibilities offered for Community action on the environ-
ment prior to the Single European Act by articles 100 and 235. Vandermeersch, The Single
European Act and the Environmental Policy of the European Economic Community, 12 EUR. L.
REV. 407, 422 (1987). Article 130R(4) also requires that the Member States finance and
implement the Community's environmental protection measures, except where to do so would
prejudice "certain measures of a Community nature." EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130R(4),
added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 25. Article 130R(5) makes it clear that, within their respec-
tive spheres, both the Community and the Member States may cooperate with third countries
and international organizations, and may negotiate and conclude international agreements.
Id. art. 130R(5).
A ninth declaration adopted by the intergovernmental conference in the Final Act pur-
ports to bar the Community institutions in their environmental protection activities from inter-
fering with Member State policies in the energy field. Final Act, supra note 24, at 25
("Declaration on Article 130R of the EEC Treaty").
145. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130T, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 25. How-
ever, there is some limit on Member State autonomy, since national measures must still be
"'compatible" with the EEC Treaty. Id.
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Community institutions will properly seek to advance environmental
concerns as a component of some other Community policy and
thereby benefit from the availability of qualified majority voting in the
Council. However, determining the maximum environmental compo-
nent permitted in legislation ostensibly directed to meeting other goals
may be difficult. Ultimately, the Court of Justice may have to ensure
that the Council follows the voting procedure associated with the
dominant policy objective pursued in the legislation. 146  The sub-
sidiarity principle itself implies standards for determining when envi-
ronmental protection measures are in fact better taken at one level
than the other. However, the institutions will probably be guided
more by the prevailing political circumstances than by any fixed set of
legal rules, and the scope of judicial review will be correspondingly
limited. 47
E. Research and Development
In keeping with a familiar pattern, the Single Act's formal intro-
duction of research and development into the EEC Treaty framework
represents an endorsement of the Community's previous involvement
in the field and a promise of more sustained activity in the future. 4 8
Driven by the need for technological progress to boost Europe's com-
petitiveness in the world economy, and cognizant of the advantages of
technological cooperation on a Community-wide scale, the institu-
tions throughout the 1970's and early 1980's devoted an increasing
(though never a large) share of the Community budget to research
146. See Glaesner, supra note 16, at 294 (citing Re the Draft International Agreement on
Natural Rubber, Opinion 1/78, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2871, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
639, the opinion of the Court of Justice on the proper legal basis of the draft international
agreement on natural rubber). More recently, the Court of Justice has had several opportuni-
ties to underscore the importance of using the correct legal basis for legislation, particularly
when the applicable voting formula may be affected. See infra note 214 and accompanying
text. See generally Note, The EEC Legislative Process. An Evolving Balance? 27 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 679 (1989).
The choice between using article 100A and the environmental provisions of the Treaty
does not only entail a difference in voting formula. Measures taken in the environmental area
generally set minimum standards only. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. Thus, they
are less useful in establishing an internal market than measures taken under article 100A,
which normally presupposes uniformity. Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 383.
147. Krimer, The Single European Act and Environment Protection: Reflections on Sev-
eral New Provisions in Community Law, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 659, 665-69 (1987);
Vandermeersch, supra note 144, at 422-23. This is particularly so since the Member States
largely preserved unanimous Council voting on environmental matters and therefore enjoy
political leverage at the legislative stage.
148. For an example of relatively early Community action in this field, see CouncilReso-
lution of Jan. 14, 1974, 17 O.J. EUR. COmm. (No. C 7) 2 (1974) (regarding coordination of
national policies and definition of actions of Community interest in the area of science and
technology).
1989]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
and development activities. The Single Act enhances this process by
making it a Treaty goal to pursue Community research initiatives in a
global framework designed to enhance their overall coherence, bal-
ance and responsiveness to various Member State priorities. 149
Thus, the Single Act does more than express Member State con-
sensus on the need to promote Europe's technological development
and enhance its international competitiveness.' 50 It also carves out a
distinct, if multifaceted, Community role in the matter. One fairly
traditional aspect of this role consists of encouraging cooperation and
joint efforts among governments, private enterprise, research centers
and universities,'51 and otherwise promoting research and develop-
ment. 152 However, the amended Treaty now also requires the Council
to plan for research and development. Acting unanimously upon a
proposal from the Commission, the Council must initially adopt a
detailed multi-year "framework program" establishing the main out-
lines, objectives, priorities and budgetary aspects of the Community's
research activities.'5 3 The Council then adopts, by qualified majority
voting, a series of specific research programs to implement various
facets of activity set out in the framework program.'54 The availabil-
ity of qualified majority voting should not only accelerate Council
decisionmaking, but also reduce the influence of narrow Mem-
ber State preoccupations. To encourage further flexibility in project
design and financing, the Single Act specifically authorizes the Com-
149. The Council had already taken some preliminary steps in this policy area. See
Council Resolution of July 25, 1983, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 208) 1 (1983) (on the frame-
work program for community research, development and demonstration activities). The
framework approach inscribed in the Single Act is therefore not an innovation.
150. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130F(1), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 24.
151. Id. arts. 130F(2) & H.
152. These other means include the Community's cooperation in the research activities
of firms, research institutes, third countries and international organizations; dissemination of
research results; and aid in the training and availability of research personnel. Id. art. 130G.
Article 130G makes it clear that Community activity in this sphere should complement and
not preempt Member State activity.
153. Id. arts. 1301, 0, & Q. The framework program covering the years 1987 to 1991
has been adopted by the Council. Council Decision 87/516, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 302)
1 (1987), as supplemented by Council Decision 88/193, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 89) 35
(1988).
154. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130K, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 24. The
Single Act's new parliamentary cooperation procedure, discussed infra Part V(B), comes into
play at this stage. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130Q(2), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 24.
Prior to the Single Act, the Council could only adopt legislation to further technology and
development on the basis of article 235, which required unanimity.
For a listing of the many specific research programs adopted under article 130K. see 1
OFFICE FOR OFFICIAl. PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, DIRECTORY 'OF
COMMUNITY LEGISLATION IN FORCE AND OTHER ACTS OF THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS
673-76 (12th ed. 1988).
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munity to launch supplementary research and development programs
involving direct collaboration with some or all the Member States, 155
as well as with non-Member States and international organizations., 56
In fact, the Act indicates that the Community should have maximum
latitude in devising appropriate structures for its research and devel-
opment programs.15
7
The considerable attention given to research and technological
development in the Single European Act leaves the strong impression
that changes in this field, more than in any other that has now for-
mally been brought within the Treaty framework, lie at the heart of
Community reform under the Act. As in those other fields, however,
the relevant Treaty provisions bring regularity and refinement more
than they bring radical change. Except for the introduction of quali-
fied majority decisionmaking, the resemblance to past practices is
striking. The detailed character of the Single Act's provisions on
research and development largely mirrors a 1985 Commission memo-
randum on the topic. 158 It thus appears that even without the Single
Act the Community would soon have established a more comprehen-
sive technology and development policy.
IV. EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION
As the preceding discussion suggests, much of the Single Euro-
pean Act legitimizes prior initiatives and encourages their further
development. There is no better example of this pattern than the Sin-
gle Act's formal recognition of the existing program of European
cooperation in foreign policy.' 5 9 European political cooperation, as
155. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 130L & M, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 24.
The amended treaty provides that programs may entail the participation of certain Member
States only, or may involve the Community as participant in the Member States' own research
and development projects. The Single Act's reference to such possibilities, in effect, endorses
the Community's participation in the Eureka programs. See 19 BULL. EUR. Comm. (No. 1)
20 (1986). Eureka is a program of government-funded research and development initiated by
the French government in 1985 as a European response to the American strategic defense
initiative. Though involving all the Member States (as well as certain non-Member States),
Eureka was deliberately set up outside the Community framework to allow for greater flexibil-
ity and freedom of action. Acting through its own permanent secretariat in Brussels, Eureka
supports civil projects ranging over a wide field.
156. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 130N, para. 1, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 24.
The details of cooperation with third parties are to be determined through international agree-
ments concluded under article 228 of the Treaty. Id. art. 130N, para. 2.
157. Id. art. 1300. However, a unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers in some
instances may be required. Id. art. 130Q.
158. Toward a European Technology Community, COM(85)320 final. See also Towards a
Technology Community, 18 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 6) 24 (1985); Lodge, supra note 20, at
216.
159. SEA, supra note 1, tit. III ("Provisions on European cooperation in the sphere of
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the program is known, had grown for over fifteen years in an essen-
tially informal and pragmatic fashion on the margins of the European
Community system. Under the Single Act, Member State repre-
sentatives continue to pursue a common European foreign policy.
However, the various undertakings of the Member States in this
department now have an identifiable legal basis and probably consti-
tute matters of international obligation. 160 These undertakings are to
consult on all foreign policy questions of general interest, to inform
one another in advance of taking actions or positions on foreign policy
matters, to seek and adhere to a Community-wide consensus, to take
other Member State attitudes into account and otherwise avoid
detracting from the force of Europe's voice in world affairs, and
finally to entertain the possibility of joint action. 16' The elevation in
status of European political cooperation is accompanied by certain
institutional changes, the most notable of which is the establishment
of a permanent secretariat in Brussels to assist the President of the
Council of Ministers, who traditionally presides ex officio over the
political cooperation program. 162
Institutionalizing Member State engagements on a matter that
touches the core of national sovereignty represents a substantial affir-
mation of European political unity. 16 3  As such, the Single Act
provisions on political cooperation should help persuade other inter-
national actors that Europe intends to speak with one voice in world
affairs. Nevertheless, the Act's actual impact on European political
unity and on the efficacy of the political cooperation system remains
debatable.
In the first place, although the framers of the Single Act placed
coordination of Member State foreign policies on a firm international
foreign policy"). The decision to place political cooperation in a separate title of the Single
European Act represents a compromise between those Member States that favored a separate
political cooperation treaty and those preferring its integration into the basic Community
treaties.
160. Id. art. 30(2)(a)-(d), (3)(c).
161. Id.
162. Id. art. 30(I0)(g). The idea of establishing a permanent secretariat charged with the
administrative aspects of political cooperation had long been a subject of consideration and
debate. See J. DE RuYT, supra note 42, at 246. Situating the secretariat in Brussels, where the
Commission has its secretariat, presents the advantage of greater coordination between the
Community and political cooperation functions.
As before, the role of the President under the Single Act is to initiate, guide and manage
the Member States' common efforts in the foreign policy sphere, as well as to represent those
states in relevant discussions with third countries and international organizations. SEA, supra
note 1, art. 30(10)(b).
163. SEA, supra note I, art. 1 (identifying "concrete progress towards European unity"
as a shared goal of the European Community and the European political cooperation systems
alike).
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law footing, they continued to entrust the enterprise to the Member
States' representatives rather than to the institutions of the Commu-
nity. Their description in intergovernmental terms of the European
Council, traditionally the highest organ for the conduct of European
political cooperation, underscores this point. 64 In fact, the Single
Act clearly indicates that foreign policy cooperation is to take place
under a regime that is fundamentally distinct from the Community's
legal framework 165 and thus fails to build any additional "bridges"
between the Community and political cooperation systems. 166 One
commentator describes the Single Act's title on cooperation in foreign
policy as "autonomous" in character.167 While apt, this description
164. Article 2 of the Single Act describes the European Council as "bring[ing] together
the Heads of State or of Government of the Member States and the President of the Commis-
sion." See supra note 7. It specifies further that the Council will be assisted by the ministers of
foreign affairs and an additional member of the Commission. SEA, supra note 1, art. 2, para.
1. The Council is directed to meet at least twice a year. Id. art. 2, para. 2. Prior to the Single
Act, the European Council conducted its activities in the political cooperation sphere solely on
the basis of the communiqu6s growing out of the December 1974 summit conference. 7 BULL.
EUR. COMm. (No. 12) 7 (1974). Article 30(3)(a), treating political cooperation as such, calls
on the ministers of foreign affairs and a member of the Commission to meet, as they now do, at
least four times a year within the political cooperation framework. Their work continues to be
prepared by the political directors meeting in the Political Committee and aided by the
European Correspondents Group and various working groups. SEA, supra note 1, art.
30(10)(c), (e), (f).
165. Article I of the Single Act provides that political cooperation is governed by the
provisions of Title III of the Act, in light of the procedures agreed to at various summit gather-
ings and in Member State practice. SEA, supra note 1, art. 1, para. 3. Article 3 adds that,
while the Community institutions are to exercise their powers under the existing Treaties, as
amended by Title II of the Single European Act, political cooperation proceeds in accordance
with Title III and the supplementary procedures mentioned in article 1. Id. art. 3. See also, id.
art. 32 (providing in effect that Title III of the Single Act-the part dealing with political
cooperation-has no bearing on the Community treaties).
166. In practice, the European Council, see supra notes 7 & 164, serves as a common
forum for discussion both of Community and foreign policy affairs. Political cooperation has
also long been regarded as a proper subject for the Council of Ministers, meeting in a non-
Community capacity, on the occasion of its regular sessions. Article 30(3)(a) of the Single Act
only ratifies this practice. Id. art. 30(3)(a). The Act also confirms the tradition that the Coun-
cil President serves concurrently as President of the political cooperation system. Id. art.
30(10)(a).
For its part, the Commission has long been involved in the political cooperation program
at all levels. In "fully associat[ing]" the Commission in the political cooperation process
through art. 30(3)(b), the Single Act entrenches this pattern, adding only that the Commission
(speaking for the Community) shares with the President of the political cooperation system
responsibility for ensuring consistency between the two systems. Id. art. 30(5).
As for the European Parliament, the Act confirms the institution's previously recognized
right to be informed and to be heard on the foreign policy issues under examination within the
political cooperation framework, and further provides that its views must be "duly taken into
consideration." Id. art. 30(4). In this way, Parliament can be "closely associated" with the
program. Id. Parliament's "close" association evidently represents a lower level of involve-
ment than the Commission's "full" association, granted by art. 30(3)(b).
167. Glaesner, supra note 16, at 285. Article 32 of the Single Act affirms that Titles I
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does not convey the essential fact that European political cooperation
under the Act remains an intergovernmental process, without the
powerful supranational elements that give Community law its special
quality. 68
The Single Act not only codifies the separation of European
political cooperation from Community activity proper, but also leaves
essentially intact the preexisting practice of political cooperation,
including the requirement of common consent for the adoption of a
common foreign policy position.169 Thus, despite their various com-
mitments, 170 the Member States have preserved their ultimate free-
dom of action in the foreign policy sphere.17 1 The scope of political
cooperation likewise remains unchanged, for the Single Act's
announcement that it embraces the political and economic aspects of
European security17 2 basically confirms prior Member State assump-
tions. 173 Especially in light of the ambitious plans for reshaping Euro-
and III do not affect the treaties establishing the European Communities. To remove any
doubt about the matter, article 31 further provides that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
does not extend to the Act's provisions on European political cooperation, European unity or
the European Council. See Freestone & Davidson, Community Competence and Part III of the
Single European Act, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 793, 796 (1986).
168. Under the third and (at the time of the Single Act) latest Political Cooperation
Report, 14 BULL. EUR. COMM. (No. 3) 14 (1981) (London Report), cooperation in the sphere
of foreign policy was still an intergovernmental rather than a Community law engagement.
The Single Act does not alter this state of affairs. Under the Act, a Member State's infringe-
ment of its obligations in the political cooperation sphere presumably will still give rise only to
the sanctions generally available under international law.
169. The Single Act is recognized as having codified the reports of Luxembourg (1970),
Copenhagen (1973) and London (1981), all on the subject of political cooperation, as well as
the Solemn Declaration of European Union (1983), see supra notes 3, 15, & 168, and certain
practices established among Member States. See SEA, supra note 1, art. 1, para. 3. See also
supra note 165. On the continuity of European political cooperation before and after the Sin-
gle European Act, see Ifestos, European Political Cooperation: Its Evolution from 1970 to 1986,
and the Single European Act, 11 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 47, 50 (1987); Nuttall, European Polit-
ical Co-operation and the Single European Act, 5 Y.B. EUR. L. 203 (1985).
170. See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
171. The Single Act speaks of a "European" rather than a "common" foreign policy,
perhaps to avoid the integrationist connotations of the term "common" in the Community law
context. SEA, supra note 1, art. 30(1).
On the other hand, the Community has an ongoing external relations competence whose
scope parallels that of its internal competence. The Single Act does not address the question of
where Community external relations (conducted by the Commission and Council) leave off
and European political cooperation (conducted intergovernmentally) begins. Judgments on
that matter inevitably will be made by the institutions and the Member States in the first
instance, subject to possible review by the Court of Justice. The Single Act merely requires
that the two sets of policies be "consistent." Id. art. 30(5).
172. Id. art. 30(6)(a).
173. The 1983 Stuttgart Declaration of European Union, supra note 15, positively
included the economic and political aspects of security within the domain of political coopera-
tion, a move already advocated in the 1981 London Report, supra note 168. Although the
Declaration did not mention the military aspects of security or defense policy, issues such as
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pean political cooperation that were circulating at the time the Single
Act was drafted,'74 the Act cannot be regarded as either significantly
enhancing the political cooperation system or as substantially build-
ing upon it for purposes of the Community's constitutional reform.
V. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM THROUGH THE SINGLE ACT
The idea of strengthening the existing political institutions has
figured prominently in discussions of constitutional reform within the
Community. The Tindemans Report, the Stuttgart Declaration and
the Draft Treaty of European Union, 175 to name only a few of the
proposals, all advocated transforming the Community into a more
fully integrated political and economic European union. Among the
elements of large-scale reform mentioned in these proposals were
transforming the Commission into a parliamentary-style Govern-
ment, elevating the European Parliament to the status of a full-fledged
legislative body, and developing the Community into a true European
federation.
Institutional reform under the Single European Act, though cer-
tainly not without interest or value, falls short of these expectations.
The Single Act's failure to upgrade or integrate the system of Euro-
pean political cooperation has already been discussed.'76 As for
reshaping the Community institutions proper, the results seem mod-
est, even though the Court of Justice, the Commission, and the Euro-
pean Parliament are all the objects of reform.
The Act's changes to the structure and function of the Court,
while substantial, do not seriously affect the Community's fundamen-
tal political arrangements. The Single Act authorizes the Council, at
the Court's request, to vote unanimously to create an inferior Com-
munity tribunal. 177 By providing for a court of first instance 78
designed primarily to determine issues of fact, the Single Act's draft-
disarmament, East-West relations and European security had long been on the political coop-
eration agenda.
174. For example, the Draft Treaty of European Union would have authorized the Euro-
pean Council to extend political cooperation to such issues as arms, arms sales, defense policy
and disarmament. Draft Treaty, supra note 5, art. 68(1). It also provided for the eventual
transfer of the entire process from the domain of Member State cooperation to that of common
action, though any such transfer was expressly declared to be freely reversible. Id. arts. 11(1),
68(3). Other ideas in circulation were to require that dissident states defer to dominant foreign
policy views, to treat foreign affairs as a Community competence proper, and to allow the
Commission a leading role in formulating European foreign policy.
175. See supra notes 3-16 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 164-174 and accompanying text.
177. ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 32d, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 4; EEC
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 168A, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 11; EAEC, supra note 2, art.
140A, added by SEA, supra note I, art. 26. Prior consultation of the Commission and the
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ers hoped to enhance judicial administration at the Community level.
However, the decisions of the new court on issues of law remain sub-
ject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice. Furthermore, actions
brought by Member States or Community institutions, as well as
those arising out of a request for a preliminary ruling, will bypass the
new tribunal altogether. Judicial reform under the Single Act, though
helpful in relieving congestion and delay in the Court 79 and therefore
in promoting the rule of law in the Community, does not implement
important constitutional change.
A. The European Commission
The treatment accorded the European Commission under the
Single Act is more complex than that accorded the Court of Justice.
The relationship between the Commission and the Council, designed
in the Treaty of Rome to produce a proper balance of centripetal and
centrifugal forces within the Community, had come to be viewed over
time as increasingly problematic. 180 Although the Treaty vests the
Commission with responsibility for drafting legislative proposals, 18'
the Commission ultimately must appeal politically to the Council in
order to secure their adoption. Because of this dynamic, the Commis-
sion has tended to temper its normal integrationist impulses in pro-
posing legislation to satisfy anticipated Member State objections.
European Parliament is required. Without these changes, it might have been necessary at a
later date to amend the Community treaties in order to create new judicial institutions.
The court or courts to be created were expected to deal with staff matters, competition
law, state aids, anti-dumping cases and other kinds of disputes that tend to be numerous and
factually complex.
178. Council Decision 88/591, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 319) 1 (1988) (establishing a
court of first instance of the European Communities). The decision confirms that the tribunal
will hear staff cases, private claims against the institutions arising out of their actions in the
competition law field, and actions against the Commission within the scope of the Coal and
Steel Community Treaty. For the time being, the tribunal will not hear anti-dumpting and
subsidy cases, as the Court of Justice had also proposed. Id. art. 3.
The tribunal will consist of twelve members, who will select from among themselves a
president to serve a three-year renewable term. Id. art. 2. It will normally sit in panels of
three to five judges.
179. The Single Act's concern with judicial efficiency is also evident in its authorization
of the Council to amend the Court's procedures as set out in Title III of the Statute of the
Court of Justice. ECSC, supra note 2, art. 45, para. 2, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 5; EEC
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 188, para. 2, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 12; EAEC, supra note
2, art. 160, para. 2, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 27. The amendment procedure is the
same as prescribed for establishing the new tribunal: a unanimous Council vote upon a propo-
sal of the Court and the advice of the Commission and Parliament. Though strict, it is still
simpler than the procedure necessary for direct amendment of the Statute of the Court, which
takes the form of a treaty protocol. Normally, that procedure would entail Member State
ratification of any amendments made.
180. See Lonbay, supra note 31, at 33.
181. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 149(1), 155.
["27:529
SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT. NEW CONSTITUTION
Over the years, a number of factors have strengthened this tendency.
These factors include the practice of voting by unanimous consent in
the Council, even on matters properly subject to majority rule; the
formation of an intergovernmental European Council capable of con-
ducting Community affairs as well as European political cooperation;
and the use of a committee system under which Member State repre-
sentatives review the Commission's exercise of authority delegated to
it by the Council. The net result of these and other trends has been to
strengthen the Member States' influence over Community policy and
to erode supranational decisionmaking in favor of intergovernmental-
ism and consensus politics. 8 ' Accordingly, one component of virtu-
ally every proposal for revitalizing the Community has been an
increase in the Commission's powers vis d vis those of the Council.
1. Delegation of Powers by the Council
The Single Act's only overt treatment of the Commission as
Community executive concerns its exercise of executive functions
delegated by Council legislation.' 83 The record suggests that, except
in certain areas (such as agricultural, commercial, and competition
policy), the Council itself has determined how Community law should
be implemented. 184 In an effort to promote delegation, and therefore
greater efficiency in Community administration,' 85 the Act adds a
provision to the EEC Treaty expressly calling on the Council to con-
fer executive authority on the Commission. 18 6 However, the original
Treaty had already authorized the Commission to exercise the powers
of implementation conferred by the Council, 8 7 and the Commission
had been using them liberally for years with the apparent blessing of
the Court.'
The Single Act also does not disturb the notion that the Council
itself may decide what powers to delegate and how to do so. On the
one hand, the Act expressly allows the Council to reserve all executive
powers to itself on any given matter, although it implies that this
182. See generally Lonbay, supra note 31, at 35.
183. This is to be contrasted with exective functions conferred directly by the Treaty.
184. See Glaesner, supra note 16, at 306.
185. There is general agreement that the Community could not have managed the
number and frequency of measures in such important spheres as agriculture] policy, the exter-
nal tariff and the common commercial policy if the Council had not delegated wide implemen-
tation powers in these domains to the Commission.
186. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 145, amended by SEA, supra note I, art. 10.
187. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 155.
188. Einffihr und Vorratsstelle fdr Getreide und Futtermittel v. K6ster Berodt & Co..
Case 25/70, 16 Recueil 1161, [1972] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 255 (1970).
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should not be the general practice.' 18 9 On the other hand, it endorses
the Council's custom of placing conditions on the Commission's use
of implementing powers, typically in the form of review by commit-
tees composed of Member State representatives. 9 With respect to
the procedures governing such review, the amended Treaty now
requires only that they "be consonant with principles and rules" that
the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
and the advice of Parliament, is to establish. 191 The Council has since
adopted a "comitology decision,"' 92 so called because it preserves the
custom of committee review. The decision establishes a framework
affording the Council a choice among three committee models for use
in future legislation entailing the delegation of executive powers to the
Commission. The models, all of which have precedent in Community
practice, vary in the degree of leverage which they afford the commit-
tees and, indirectly, the Council. For example, an advisory committee
will simply issue an opinion on implementation measures proposed by
the Commission.193 A management committee, acting by qualified
majority, can require that such measures be remitted to the Council
so that the latter, also by qualified majority and within a specified
time limit, may endorse the measure or substitute its own. 194 A
regulatory committee is one whose failure by qualified majority vote
to affirmatively approve a Commission measure causes the measure to
be referred to the Council for adoption by qualified majority. 95
189. "The Council may also reserve the right, in specific cases, to exercise directly imple-
menting powers itself." EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 145, amended by SEA, supra note 1,
art. 10 (emphasis added). For the view that article 145, as amended by the Single Act, imposes
an obligation on the Council to delegate executive power to the Commission, see Blumann, Le
pouvoir exicutif de la commission d la lumiire de l'Acte unique europien, 24 REV. TRIM. DR.
EUR. 23, 30-32 (1988); Ehlermann, Compdtences d'exdcution confdrdes d la commission: la
nouvelle ddcision-cadre du Conseil, 31 REV. M.C. 232, 233 (1988). For a more ambiguous
reading of amended article 145, see Labouz, supra note 69, at 139-40.
According to the Commission, the Council thus far has failed in practice to make the
broad and regular delegations of authority to the Commission that the Single Act requires.
Third Commission Report, supra note 27, at 7, 12, 20; Commission Midterm Report, supra note
21, at 9. The Commission evidently regards this failure as among the more disappointing
institutional features of the Single Act.
190. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
191. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 145, amended by SEA, supra note 1, art. 10.
192. Council Decision 87/373, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 197) 33 (1987) [hereinafter
Comitology Decision]. The Decision also contains special rules governing the Council's delega-
tion to the Commission of power to decide on safeguard measures. Id. art. 3.
193. The Commission is only required to "take the utmost account" of the advisory
committee's opinion and to advise the committee as to how that was done. Id. art. 2.
194. Two versions of the management committee system are provided by the comitology
decision. Variant (a) allows the Commission to defer for up to one month the application of
the measure it has adopted. Variant (b) requires the Commission to do so for a period of time
fixed in advance by the Council, but not to exceed three months. Id.
195. Presumably, if the Council decides to adopt an amended version of the measure, it
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Although the overall effect of the comitology decision is to limit the
variety and complexity of committee arrangements that may be
devised to control the Commission's exercise of delegated powers, as
well as to curtail discussion of these arrangements whenever legisla-
tion incorporating them is debated, the decision's exact impact will
not be known until the Council establishes a pattern of choice among
committee models. On its face, however, the decision seems to ratify
the Council's pattern of pervasive reliance on management and regu-
latory committees, a reliance that previously rested on constitutional
convention alone.
196
In sum, it is difficult to discern from a substantive point of view
what the Single European Act adds to previous understandings about
delegations to the Commission. Although it represents a further
expression of support for delegation, an attitude that is understand-
able in light of the enormously complex and technical character of
many of the measures still required for completion of the internal
market, the Single Act essentially builds upon a familiar procedural
landscape. Clearly the drafters were not prepared, as were propo-
nents of the Draft Treaty of European Union' 97 and other reform
proposals, 98 to acknowledge the Commission's inherent executive
must vote unanimously to do so. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 149(1), amended by SEA,
supra note 1, art. 7. Two different options are provided for the case in which the Council fails
to act within the time allotted. Under one variant, the Commission is free definitively to adopt
its own proposal. Under a second variant-introduced into the comitology decision by the
Council over the objections of the Commission-the Council, though unable to act by qualified
majority, may still block the implementing measure by a simple majority vote to that effect.
Comitology Decision, supra note 192, art. 2. This variant on the regulatory committee proce-
dure goes beyond the other committee options and prior practices in the ease with which it
allows the Council to defeat the Commission's exercise of delegated powers and in its tendency
to favor nondecision. Parliament's legal challenge to the comitology decision, largely inspired
by its opposition to this second variant of the regulatory committee, was recently rejected by
the Court of Justice on the basis of Parliament's lack of standing under article 173 of the EEC
Treaty to challenge Community acts in the Court. Parliament v. Council, Case 302/87, Sept.
27, 1988 (not yet reported). See infra note 227.
196. The Commission sought unsuccessfully at the intergovernmental conference to con-
fine the Council to use of the advisory committee model. Glaesner, supra note 16, at 307. It
was only able to obtain from the conference a first declaration in the Final Act urging that the
Council, in the interest of an efficient decisionmaking process, give priority to the advisory
committee procedure in delegating powers to the Commission for completion of the internal
market. See Final Act, supra note 24, at 24 (Declaration on the powers of implementation of
the Commission).
Thus far, the Council's practice, at least in internal market measures, has been to favor
the management and regulatory committee model over the advisory committee model. The
Commission has strongly and repeatedly condemned this pattern as counterproductive and
contrary to the intent of the Single Act's framers. See Commission Midterm Report, supra note
21, at 9.
197. Draft Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 28(4), 40.
198. For example, the Dooge Committee Report had recommended that the Commis-
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authority or otherwise attribute to it autonomous executive powers.
2. Qualified Majority Voting in the Institutional Equation
The Single Act's more significant strategy for strengthening the
Commission entails change in the voting majority required for enact-
ment of legislation by the Council, in particular a decided shift toward
qualified majority rule. Although the drafters were moved in this
direction partly by a simple desire to speed up the legislative process,
they also realized that the Commission would enjoy greater political
latitude to the extent that its proposals needed the support of only a
qualified majority of votes in the Council of Ministers rather than a
unanimous vote of the Council. The Single Act thus extends the
regime of qualified majority voting to a wide variety of matters previ-
ously subject to a rule of unanimity.1 99 Many of these matters-the
alteration or suspension of duties, 0 the right of establishment, 0'
restrictions on the freedom to provide services, 202 the free movement
of capital,20 3 sea and air transport,2° research and technological
development, 0 5 use of the European Regional Development Fund,20 6
worker safety and health,20 7 certain environmental decisions20  and
sion be accorded fully autonomous powers of initiation, implementation and management. See
J. DE RUYT, supra note 42, at 140. The Commission itself had sought at the intergovernmen-
tal conference a general and direct grant of implementing powers with respect to the internal
market program. See Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 403.
199. The original EEC Treaty provided for qualified majority voting only in such spheres
as agriculture, competition law or commercial policy, where a Community policy was discerni-
ble or could readily be established. See J. DE RUYT, supra note 42, at 112-13. Initiatives on
most other fronts required resort to articles 100 or 235, both of which called for the unanimous
consent of the Council.
200. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 28, amended by SEA, supra note 1, art. 16.
201. Id. art. 57(2). The change in voting relates to directives on the right of establish-
ment in the fields of savings protection, lending, banking, and exercise of the medical,
paramedical and pharmaceutical professions. Legislation in all of these areas previously
required a unanimous vote in the Council. There remains a narrow exception for "amendment
of the existing principles laid down by law governing the professions with respect to training
and conditions of access for natural persons." The exception was made at the request of West
Germany. See Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 377.
202. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 59(2), amended by SEA, supra note 1, art. 16. The
change to qualified majority voting specifically concerns the decision to extend the principle of
free movement of services to nationals of third countries established within a Member State.
203. Id. art. 70(1). Article 70 governs only capital movements between Member and
non-Member States. The Single Act specifically preserves unanimous voting for decisions that
retreat from the liberalization of capital movements.
204. Id. art. 84(2). In certain circumstances, unanimity remains the rule.
205. Id. arts. 130K, L, M, N, P(l), Q(2), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 24. However.
the adoption of 12framework program for research and technological development requires
unanimity. Id. art. 130 Q(1).
206. Id. art. 130E, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 23.
207. Id. art. 118A, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 21.
208. Id. art. 130S, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 25. However, environmental meas-
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the Single Act's new general harmonization provisions209 -relate
directly or indirectly to completion of the internal market. Accord-
ingly, their governance by qualified majority vote should be viewed in
part as a means of more efficiently advancing that program. How-
ever, the drafters of the Single Act did not make qualified majority
voting the general rule, even for measures in furtherance of the inter-
nal market. 210  For example, they could not secure agreement to
introduce majority voting in the area of fiscal harmonization,2 or in
the Community's exercise of implied powers under article 235 of the
EEC Treaty. The Act concededly creates large possibilities for har-
monization by qualified majority under articles 100A and 100B, as
opposed to unanimous voting under article 100,212 but only, as previ-
ously discussed, 21 3 at the cost of making multiple escape devices avail-
able to dissident Member States. Given its limited sphere of
application, the extension of qualified majority voting under the Sin-
gle European Act may best be viewed as targeting matters on which
the politics of unanimity is no longer deemed desirable. If this is so, it
is more important now than ever for the Commission and Council to
select the legally correct bases for their legislative initiatives.21 4
ures may be adopted by qualified majority if a previous enactment, itself adopted by unanim-
ity, so provides. Id. Otherwise, unanimity remains the rule.
209. Id. arts. 100A, 100B, added by SEA, supra note 1, arts. 18, 19.
210. The Commission originally proposed a general qualified majority rule for measures
having to do with completion of the internal market, but the intergovernmental conference
preferred to enumerate the Treaty articles in which the rule was to be introduced. See
Ehlermann, supra note 27, at 376.
211. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. The drafters also declined the Commis-
sion's invitation to subject to qualified majority voting in the Council both the regulation of
migrant workers' social security, EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 51, and the police power over
aliens, id. art. 56(2).
212. Recall that articles 100A and 100B have no application to fiscal matters, the free
movement of persons, or the rights and interests of employees. See supra notes 78-82 and
accompanying text.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 54-71.
214. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. The Court of Justice has been asked on
several occasions since adoption of the Single Act to examine the validity of the legal basis
selected by the Council for its enactments. On the first such occasion, the Court upheld the
Commission's right to bring such a challenge and found that the Council had improperly
substituted unanimous voting under the article 235 implied powers provision for qualified
majority voting under article 113 when it adopted certain tariff preferences for developing
countries. Commission v. Council, Case 45/86, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1493, [1988] 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 131. For a full discussion of the case, see Note, supra note 146, at 713-18.
The Court has also entertained Member State claims that Council legislation adopted by
qualified majority vote over that State's dissent ought to have been subject to unanimous vot-
ing. In both reported cases of this type, the Court found the Council's resort to qualified
majority voting entirely proper. United Kingdom v. Council, Case 68/86, [1988] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 543 (1988) (Council's adoption by qualified majority of a hormone ban pursuant to
article 43 on agricultural policy is proper even though it also had consumer protection in view,
and resort to unanimous voting under article 100 is therefore unnecessary); United Kingdom
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Ultimately, extending qualified majority voting to a wider range
of issues will not succeed as a reform strategy unless the Council actu-
ally votes on those issues. Although the negotiators of the Single Act
were unwilling to address the future of the Member State veto associ-
ated with the Luxembourg Accords,215 they did recognize the general
importance of conducting votes on qualified majority matters. Dur-
ing the 1986 ratification period, under pressure from the Commission
and especially from Parliament, the Council agreed to modify its
internal rules of procedure to compel the Council President to call a
vote whenever a request to that effect is made by a Member State or
the Commission and is supported by a majority of Member States.2 16
In practice, this amendment goes a long way to securing the political
advantages of qualified majority voting.
Notwithstanding the greater scope and effectiveness of qualified
majority voting under the Single European Act, the fact remains that
some important measures continue to require unanimous consent in
the Council.2 17 Moreover, the passage of legislation by qualified maj-
ority vote under the Single Act presupposes, as before, that the Coun-
cil act in accordance with the Commission proposal currently before
it, since any departure from that proposal requires a unanimous
Council vote.218 Coupled with the Single Act's general continuity
with past practices on delegation to the Commission, the cautious
v. Council, Case 131/86, [1988] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 364 (1988) (rules for protection of laying
hens may be adopted by majority vote as an agricultural measure under article 43 without need
for additional reliance on article 100).
All of the cited cases involved the choice between a specific legal basis and a general one,
such as article 100 or 235, and therefore were influenced by a preference for the lex specialis.
See generally Bradley, The European Court and the Legal Basis of Community Legislation, 13
EUR. L. REV. 379, 388-94 (1988).
215. See infra Part V(C).
216. Rules of Procedure of the Council of Ministers, art. 5(1), as amended by Council
Amendment 87/508, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291) 27 (1987). See generally J. DE RuYT,
supra note 42, at 118-19. The President of the Council filed a twelfth declaration in the Final
Act of the intergovernmental conference committing the Council to early improvements in its
decisionmaking procedures. See Final Act, supra note 24, at 26 ("Declaration by the Presi-
dency on the time limit within which the Council will give its opinion following a first reading
(Article 149(2) of the EEC Treaty")).
217. For example, the EEC Treaty still subjects to unanimous vote the following: adop-
tion of the Community's general program for research, EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art.
130Q(1), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 24; the general regulation governing structural
funds, id. art. 130D, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 23; the regime of management and
regulatory committees, id. art. 145, amended by SEA, supra note 1, art. 10; fiscal harmoniza-
tion, id. art. 99, amended by SEA, supra note 1, art. 17; and conceivably all environmental
protection measures, id. art. 130S, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 25.
218. Id. art. 149(1), amended by SEA, supra note 1, art. 7. The Commission, also as
before, generally may amend its proposal at any time to conform with current Council senti-
ments and thereby permit its enactment by a qualified majority. Id. art. 149(3).
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extension of qualified majority voting underscores the Member States'
unreadiness for some of the more dramatic strategies that were avail-
able for strengthening the Commission vis d vis the Council. Their
unwillingness to vest the Commission with autonomous executive
power has already been mentioned. 19 Further, they did not embrace,
nor even seriously consider, the idea of drawing the Commissioners
from the European Parliament in the fashion of a parliamentary-style
Government.220 Such a change would have given the Commission a
political power base and thereby greatly enhanced its stature and
influence.
B. The European Parliament: A Legislative Role
Like the Commission, the European Parliament seemed poised
for institutional gains under the reforms discussed in the years preced-
ing the Single Act. In some ways, the "democratic deficit" that Par-
liament's direct election221 sought to cure was only heightened by the
institution's virtual powerlessness in the legislative process. Aside
from budgetary matters, 222 Parliament played a merely consultative
role, and then only on a limited number of subjects as a matter of
right.223  The prospective elevation of Parliament under the Draft
Treaty of European Union nearly to the status of a co-legislator with
the Council224 illustrates the institutional ground it stood to gain.
The same may be said of other proposals for strengthening the Com-
mission's accountability to Parliament, such as giving Parliament the
right to confirm the nomination of Commission President, to vote on
219. See supra text accompanying notes 189-196.
220. Thus there is no reason ever to suppose that the composition of the Commission
reflects political sentiment in the European Parliament. See generally J. DE RUYT, supra note
42, at 119-20.
221. Members of the European Parliament have been elected directly by citizens of the
Member States since 1979. Prior to that, representatives were chosen from among members of
each state's national parliament.
222. In budgetary matters, Parliament has a real power of co-decision. Treaty Amending
Certain Budgetary Provisions, 14 J.O. Comm. EUR. (No. L 2) 1 (1971); Treaty Amending Cer-
tain Financial Provisions, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No L 359) 1 (1977).
223. Probably the most positive development for Parliament's role in the legislative pro-
cess prior to the Single Act was the 1975 Joint Declaration of the institutions setting up a
conciliation procedure for all legislation having "appreciable financial implications" and not
required by existing Community law. Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil and the Commission, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 89) 1 (1975). On a matter subject to the
procedure, whenever the Council intends to depart from a parliamentary opinion, it must first
participate in conciliation with Parliament in an effort to reach agreement.
224. Draft Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 36, 38. Parliamentary co-decision was also en-
dorsed in the Tindemans Report, supra note 3, and in the earlier Vedel Committee Report,
Report by the Ad Hoc Group examining the question of increasing Parliament's Powers, 5 BULl'.
EUR. COmm. (Supp. 4) (1972) [hereinafter Vendel Committee Report].
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the Commission's investiture and, at the extreme, to supply the Com-
mission's membership. 225 The idea of parliamentary co-decision
encountered difficulties because it necessarily lessened the Council's
political power and thereby fundamentally altered the balance
between supranationalism and national sovereignty within the Com-
munity legal order. On the other hand, suggestions for increasing the
Commission's accountability to Parliament failed on account of their
tendency to move the Community too rapidly toward a parliamentary
model of government.226 Still, given the wide range of available
options, the Single Act's treatment of Parliament comes as a disap-
pointment to advocates of a substantially enhanced role for that
institution.227
1. The New Parliamentary Cooperation
The Single European Act changes Parliament's legislative func-
tions in three ways. First, it increases the number of subjects as to
which Parliament is consulted as of right on Commission propos-
als.228 Second, it breaks newer ground by actually requiring parlia-
mentary assent with respect to two matters: the accession of new
Member States229 and the Community's entry into association agree-
225. See, e.g., Vedel Committee Report, supra note 224.
226. J. DE RUYT, supra note 42, at 119-20. Under both the original and amended
Treaty, Parliament has only the right to censure the Commission and thereby force its collec-
tive resignation. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 144.
227. The Single European Act also refrains from giving Parliament a treaty-based right
under article 173 to challenge acts of the Council or Commission in the Court of Justice, even
though the Commission supported that idea in the intergovernmental conference. Parliamen-
tary standing was an open question until recently. In 1985, the Court of Justice admitted that
Parliament could proceed against the Council under article 175 for its failure to act. Parlia-
ment v. Council, Case 13/83, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1513, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
138. The following year, it held that parliamentary action could be a proper object of annul-
ment proceedings under article 173. Parti 6cologiste "Les Verts" v. Parliament, Case 294/83,
1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1339, [1987] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 343; Council v. Parliament, Case
34/86, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2155, [1986] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 94. However, the Court
confirmed in 1988 that Parliament as a general matter lacks standing to seek annulment of
Council or Commission acts under article 173. Parliament v. Council, Case 302/87, Sept. 27,
1988 (not yet reported). See infra note 255.
By contrast, the Draft Treaty, supra note 5, art. 43, extended to all Community institu-
tions the same status before the Court of Justice.
228. The Single Act itself expressly brings many of these subjects within the Community
sphere. See SEA, supra note 1, arts. 4, 11, & 26 (decisions concerning the Court of Justice);
art. 10 (Commission implementation practices); art. 17 (fiscal harmonization); art. 23 (reor-
ganization of structural funds); art. 24 (certain decisions on research and technological devel-
opment); art. 25 (on environmental protection). On the other hand, action in many of these
areas previously had been taken under the implied powers provision, EEC Treaty, supra note
2, art. 235, which also required the advice of Parliament.
229. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 237, amended by SEA, supra note 1, art. 8.
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ments with third countries. 230 Thus, the Single Act strictly limits the
scope of parliamentary co-decision. Combined with the Act's denial
to Parliament of any formal role in the Commission's use of executive
authority delegated to it by the Council,2 3 ' these institutional changes
must be construed as modest.
Parliament's only real gains under the Act came from a third
innovation, namely the introduction in a limited sphere of a modified
legislative process called the "cooperation procedure. 2 32  This new
procedure's essential feature, apart from its constitutional originality,
is precisely the enhanced participation it accords Parliament in the
legislative process. Essentially, the cooperation procedure replaces
the usual legislative process in certain designated fields.233 The proce-
dure requires that the Council solicit Parliament's opinion on any leg-
islative proposals emanating from the Commission.a 34  Upon
230. Id. art. 238, amended by SEA, supra note 1, art. 9. Parliament previously had no
formal role whatsoever in accession or association agreements.
The Commission and certain Member States had suggested that parliamentary assent be
required in still other Council decisions-for example, Treaty amendments, internal market
measures and measures in the newer sectors-but the negotiators of the Single Act did not
agree. See J. DE RuYT, supra note 42, at 122. The Act also refrains from giving Parliament a
power of co-decision, or even a consultative role, over the Community's trade agreements
under articles 113 and 114 of the EEC Treaty.
231. This was a legislative role that Parliament had earnestly sought in the negotiations
leading to the Single Act. See Bieber, Pantalis & Schoo, Implications of the Single Act for the
European Parliament, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 767, 789-90 (1986).
232. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 149, amended by SEA, supra note 1, art. 7. See
generally Bieber, Pantalis & Schoo, supra note 231.
233. Among these fields, all of which call for adoption by qualified majority only, some
were contemplated in the original EEC Treaty and others were added by the Single Act itself.
Measures in the former category relate to discrimination based on nationality or impairment of
the principle of free movement of persons. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 7, amended by
SEA, supra note 1, art. 6 (elimination of nationality based discrimination); id. art. 49 (free
movement of workers); id. arts. 54(2), 56(2) sent. 2 (freedom of establishment); id. art. 57,
except para. 2 sent. 2 (mutual recognition of diplomas). With respect to one of these fields,
measures taken under article 49 originally required only a simple majority vote in the Council,
so that bringing them within the sphere of parliamentary cooperation has had the effect of
making their enactment more rather than less difficult.
On the other hand, those competences added by the Single Act offer the cooperation
procedure a broader sphere of operation. This refers more to the wide-ranging opportunities
for harmonization in aid of the internal market offered by articles IOOA and IOOB, discussed
earlier at supra Parts II(A) & (C), both of which expressly entail parliamentary cooperation,
rather than to the harmonization in the specified fields of worker health and safety regulations,
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 118A, added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 21; decisions on spend-
ing from the Regional Development Fund, id. art. 130E, added by SEA, supra note I, art. 23;
or various aspects of research and technological development, id. art. 130Q(2), added by SEA.
supra note 1, art. 24. Even so, the field of application of the cooperation procedure is strictly
enumerated.
234. Not only is Parliament free to express an opinion on a proposal, but it may seek to
persuade the Commission to withdraw or amend the proposal before the Council has had an
opportunity to act upon it. Because the proposal that the Commission eventually submits to
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receiving Parliament's opinion, the Council, by qualified majority vote
(or, if it seeks to amend the Commission proposal, by unanimous
vote), may approve a provisional outcome, or "common position. '235
Thus far, the cooperation procedure resembles the usual course of
qualified majority legislation. The difference is that instead of adopt-
ing a definitive text, the Council launches a "second reading." This
entails transmitting the common position to Parliament for fresh con-
sideration, along with an explanation of views by both the Council
and the Commission. Should Parliament within the next three
months either approve the common position by a majority of votes
cast or remain silent, the Council must adopt the common position
without further change. 236  However, the situation is different if
within the same three months, Parliament votes by an absolute major-
ity of its membership either to amend the common position or to
reject it outright.2 37 If Parliament rejects the common position, then
the Council still may adopt the measure within three months, though
only if it votes unanimously to do so. This result may not be feasible,
particularly if the Council had originally approved the common posi-
tion only by a qualified majority vote.238
If Parliament proposes amendments to the common position, the
matter returns to the Commission for a reexamination of its original
proposal in light of the suggestions made by Parliament. 39 By
directing parliamentary amendments to the Commission for review,
rather than to the Council for an immediate vote, the cooperation
procedure preserves the Commission's traditional monopoly in pro-
posing legislation to the Council. Within one month, the Commission
forwards its reexamined proposal to the Council for a second reading,
the Council forms the basis for a provisional decision, and because that decision in turn
becomes the point of reference for all subsequent debate and modifications, it is essential that
Parliament seek to exert its influence over the Commission at an early stage. For a discussion
of ways to open an early dialogue between Parliament and the Commission, see Fitzmaurice,
An Analysis of the European Community's Co-operation Procedure, 26 J. COMM. MKT. STUD.
389 (1988). See also Note, supra note 146, at 708-09.
235. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 149(2)(a), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 7.
236. Id. art. 149(2)(b).
237. Significantly, amendment or rejection by Parliament of the common position
requires a vote to that effect by an absolute majority of the body's membership, whether pres-
ent and voting or not. The fact that the majority needed to deviate from the Council's com-
mon position is more difficult to attain than the simple majority of votes cast required to
approve it may create an incentive for Parliament to favor the position. See Note, supra note
146, at 700.
238. If the Council cannot muster the unanimity required to override the rejection, no
action may be taken on the measure. The Council also may not at this stage amend the com-
mon position in order to secure unanimous support. Parliament's disapproval of the common
position therefore may become a cause of inaction on the Community's part.
239. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 149(2)(c), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 7.
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indicating specifically the parliamentary amendments it has chosen
not to incorporate. 40 Unfortunately, the wording of the Single Act is
ambiguous as to whether the Commission may amend the proposal in
ways other than Parliament has suggested. While the text does not
clearly confine the Commission to choosing among the amendments
advanced by Parliament on its second reading, 241 such a construction
would ensure that the final proposal and vote involve a text that Par-
liament voted on and helped to shape.242 Ultimately, the Court of
Justice will be called upon to resolve this question and thereby help
determine the extent to which the Single Act's cooperation procedure
has strengthened the parliamentary presence in the legislative process.
After receiving the Commission's reexamined proposal, the
Council may vote either by qualified majority to adopt the proposal or
by unanimity to adopt it together with any parliamentary amend-
ments not accepted by the Commission, or with amendments of the
Council's own choosing.243 The Single Act is equally ambiguous as to
the Council's freedom of action during its second reading. The text
does not clearly confine the Council to adding parliamentary amend-
ments to, or deleting them from, the Commission's new proposal. 24
Different views have been advanced on the wisdom of confining the
Council's amendment power. On the one hand, allowing the Council
substantial freedom to adopt unanimously a text that deviates from
the Commission's pending proposal would maintain a traditional
principle of Community lawmaking.245 On the other hand, limiting
the Council on second reading to considering only the amendments
240. Id. art. 149(2)(d).
241. Article 149(2)(d) of the amended treaty merely describes the Commission's reexam-
ination as "taking into account" the parliamentary amendments and requires that the Com-
mission indicate those among them that it has not embraced. This clearly suggests that the
parliamentary amendments will be the focus of the reexamination, but does not necessarily
prevent the Commission from considering other changes.
242. For forceful policy arguments that the Commission should have to select from
among the parliamentary amendments, see Glaesner, supra note 63, at 466-67; Jacqu6, supra
note 77, at 592-93; Note, supra note 146, at 704-05. See also Bieber, Pantalis & Schoo, supra
note 231, at 784. For the view that the Commission may exercise a wider scope of amendment,
see J. DE RuYT, supra note 42, at 132 (relying in part on article 149(3) of the amended treaty,
which broadly reaffirms the Commission's freedom to alter its proposal at any time as long as
the Council has not acted). See also Lonbay, supra note 31, at 60; Usher, The Single European
Act, 19 BRACTON L.J. 64, 67 (1987).
243. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 149(2)(d) & (e), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 7.
244. Article 149(2)(d) expressly allows the Council to adopt by unanimity those parlia-
mentary amendments that the Commission did not accept, thereby suggesting that its focus on
second reading be on those amendments. However, paragraph (e), which also requires una-
nimity in order for the Council to amend the reexamined proposal, suggests that the Council
may consider other amendments as well.
245. See generally T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 33 (2d ed. 1988). See also Lonbay, supra note 31, at 60.
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proposed by Parliament again would ensure a significant place for
Parliament's views in the remaining legislative debate.2 46 The Court
of Justice eventually will be called upon to settle this question as well,
and again help determine the real strength of Parliament's voice in the
parliamentary cooperation procedure. Finally, if the Council does not
act within three months after receiving the Commission's reexamined
proposal, the whole proposal lapses.247 This feature of the coopera-
tion procedure, as much as any other, has fed fears that the process
may result in delay and inaction.248
Although the cooperation procedure unquestionably enhances
Parliament's voice in the legislative process, it is limited in scope and
function. As previously discussed,2 49 the procedure applies only to
the adoption of measures specifically designated in the Single Euro-
pean Act. In regard to other matters subject to qualified majority
voting or matters that, whatever the voting requirement, seem central
to achieving the internal market,25 ° Parliament has at most a
246. See generally Glaesner, supra note 63, at 467; Note, supra note 146, at 706-07.
247. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 149(2)(f), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 7. The
three-month period allotted for both Parliament's and the Council's second reading may be
extended by one month if both institutions agree. Id. art. 149(2)(g). If the proposal lapses,
there will have to be a new Commission proposal, followed by two successive readings in
Parliament and Council, to adopt the legislation.
The passage of three months without Council action is not unlikely. When Parliament
forwards amendments to the common position, and .the Commission is called upon to reformu-
late its proposal, the political pressures affecting the Council may be such that it is unable to
take definitive action within the allotted time.
The rule of tacit nonadoption of the reexamined Commission proposal stated in the text
deliberately favors the Council's position. The Council's inaction results in adoption neither of
the Commission proposal nor of the parliamentary version, if different. By contrast, the Draft
Treaty of European Union provided that in the event either the Council or Parliament failed to
submit draft legislation to a vote, the measure would be deemed adopted, provided the other
body had voted for it. Of course, the Draft Treaty had broadly accepted the idea of parliamen-
tary co-decision. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The Single Act plainly reflects the
Member States' unwillingness even at this particular stage of the cooperation procedure to give
Parliament the "last legislative word." See generally J. DE RUYT, supra note 42, at 136-37.
248. See generally Lodge, supra note 20, at 215. A certain amount of delay inheres in
any legislative process that calls for two readings by each participating institution, especially
when, as in the cooperation procedure, the first reading does not entail time limitations. The
Council, in particular, is under no time constraint in arriving at a common position after
receiving Parliament's opinion upon first reading. By contrast, Parliament must respond to
the common position within three months.
The Commission, reporting in March 1988 on the progress of the internal market pro-
gram, found a substantial backlog in proposals pending before the Council, and attributed this
partly to delays associated with the parliamentary cooperation procedure. Third Commission
Report, supra note 27, at 11. However, by the time of its midterm progress report in Novem-
ber of that year, the Commission found that the pace of decisionmaking under the procedure
had quickened. Commission Midterm Report, supra note 21, at 9.
249. See supra text accompanying note 233.
250. For matters that are subject to qualified majority voting, though not subject to the
parliamentary cooperation procedure, see EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 55 (measures con-
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consultative function in the legislative process.251 The reasons for
introducing parliamentary cooperation into some, rather than all,
areas of Community legislation, or for selecting certain areas rather
than others, have never been adequately explained.252 Critics have
aptly remarked how the difference in parliamentary function under
the ordinary and the cooperation procedures may cause institutional
conflict over the proper legal basis of proposed legislation, with Par-
liament arguing wherever possible for a basis that entails parliamen-
tary cooperation and the Council preferring one that avoids it. 253
Such disputes, much like those caused by the Council's preference for
legal bases requiring unanimous rather than qualified majority vot-
ing,254 will inevitably reach the Court of Justice.2 5
2. The Dynamics of Parliamentary Cooperation
The cooperation procedure fails to dramatically improve the
Community legislative process, not only because of its limited sphere
of application, but also because of the functionally limited role it
assigns to Parliament. As previously discussed, 25 6 the cooperation
procedure does not confer on Parliament a real power of co-decision.
Of course, that fact alone does not deprive the procedure of signifi-
cance for Parliament. Cooperation allows Parliament to undertake a
second reading of proposed legislation, which provides Parliament
cerning the public service exception to the freedom of establishment); arts. 59 (as amended) &
63 (free movement of services); arts. 69 & 70(1) (as amended) (free movement of capital); art.
28 (as amended) (modification or suspension of tariffs); art. 43 (agricultural policy); arts. 75(1)
& 84 (as amended) (transport policy). Those articles listed as amended were amended by the
Single European Act, supra note 1, art. 16.
251. For example, in the area of the free movement of capital, Parliament still does not
have a right to be consulted on pending legislation. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 67-73.
252. See generally J. DE RUYT, supra note 42, at 127. One anomaly is that the free
movement of services is not subject to the new cooperation procedure even though it is closely
linked to the free movement of workers and freedom of establishment, both of which are sub-
ject to the new procedure. Until now, they all had been governed by similar voting principles.
See Murphy, supra note 3, at 243-44.
253. Fitzmaurice, supra note 234, at 394; Lodge, The Single European Act and the New
Legislative Cooperation Procedure: A Critical Analysis, 11 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 5, 14-15
(1987).
254. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
255. When the Commission proposed and the Council adopted the so-called "post-
Chernobyl" regulation on radiation levels, Council Regulation 3954/87, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 371) 11 (1987), on the basis of article 31 of the Euratom Treaty rather than article
100A of the EEC Treaty, Parliament strenuously objected on the ground that those institu-
tions had thereby avoided the parliamentary cooperation procedure. See Fitzmaurice, supra
note 234, at 394. Parliament's challenge in the Court of Justice, European Parliament v.
Council, Case 70/88 (still pending), faces a substantial standing problem. See supra note 227.
For a fuller discussion, see Note, supra note 146, at 697 n.l 12.
256. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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with the opportunity to influence a legislative proposal that has rip-
ened into a provisional Council position. By proposing amendments
to the common position, Parliament can require a second reading by
the Commission and, regardless of outcome, by the Council, which
naturally increases the opportunities to exert legislative influence. If
Parliament finds the Council's common position altogether unaccept-
able, it can require the Council to act by unanimity. 7 Unless exer-
cised in an abusive manner, these various prerogatives and, perhaps
more importantly, the mere prospect of their exercise may cause the
Commission and the Council to embrace certain parliamentary views
they otherwise would not favor. Parliament's hand will thus be
strengthened.
Nevertheless, the cooperation procedure still only allows Parlia-
ment to persuade rather than to decide. In order to defeat legislation,
Parliament must reject the legislation and then dissuade one or more
states from supporting it in the Council of Ministers. Where Parlia-
ment instead votes to amend the Council's common position, it will
endeavor to persuade the Commission of its views, in which case only
a qualified majority of the Council will be needed to adopt them. If
Parliament is unable to convince the Commission, it still may use its
influence in the Council to prevent adoption of the reexamined propo-
sal by qualified majority.
At all stages, Parliament has a strong interest in winning Com-
mission support for its views; for unless it does so, it will later face the
even more difficult task of rallying the Council's unanimous con-
sent.2 58 Moreover, in the competition for Council favor, the Commis-
sion enjoys the advantage that only its proposal may be enacted by
qualified majority in the Council. Throughout the cooperation proce-
dure, Parliament can neither force its views on an unwilling Commis-
257. Parliamentary influence must be timely, however. A failure to respond to the com-
mon position within three months entitles the Council to enact it into law as it stands. EEC
Treaty, supra note 2, art. 149(2)(b), added by SEA, supra note 1, art. 7. By contrast, the
Council's failure to take action within three months from receipt of the Commission's reexam-
ined proposal simply brings the legislative process to an end. Id. art. 149(2)(f). See supra note
247 and accompanying text.
258. The Commission's failure to incorporate Parliament's proposed amendments in its
reexamined proposal conceivably could lead to a parliamentary motion of censure under arti-
cle 144 of the Treaty. If successful, this motion would cause the Commission's removal from
office. Though the censure motion has never been used, the prospect of its use may serve to
strengthen Parliament's hand in its dealings with the Commission under the cooperation pro-
cedure. On the possibility of censure in this situation, see Jacqu6, supra note 77, at 593;
Labouz, supra note 69, at 154; and Note, supra note 146, at 682, 703.
On at least one occasion, the Commission has cited the Council's "occasional tendency"
in its practice of the cooperation procedure to reject systematically Parliament's proposed
amendments. Third Commission Report, supra note 27, at 13.
[27:529
SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT NEW CONSTITUTION
sion nor prevent the Council from adopting legislation over its
objections. There also remains the possibility that these institutions,
on second reading, may be entitled to entertain amendments that Par-
liament has never considered. 5 9 Finally, any assessment of the proce-
dure must consider the fact that gains made in parliamentary power
come at the cost of additional complexity and potential for delay in
the legislative process. 260
Despite their shortcomings, the expansion of qualified majority
voting and the introduction of parliamentary cooperation represent
the Single European Act's most significant elements of institutional
reform. Though the former primarily affects the Commission, and
the latter the Parliament, together they reflect both a real and sym-
bolic shift in influence within the Community system away from the
Member States. The increase in use of qualified majority voting in the
Council necessarily weakens the single-nation veto, thereby enabling
the Commission and Council to pass legislation more easily over the
objection of minority states. Those states are thus rendered more
amenable to compromise. To the extent that the cooperation proce-
dure enhances the power and status of Parliament, 261 it too strength-
ens an integrationist voice within the Community. In the final
analysis, however, both initiatives (much like the Act's treatment of
delegation to the Commission) should be viewed not simply as institu-
tional reform for its own sake, or for the sake of strengthening a Com-
munity outlook, but also as aspects of the Single Act's overriding
programmatic goal of creating a market without internal frontiers.
Achieving that goal entails the adoption of a great deal of legislation
before the end of 1992. The adoption of this legislation represents a
challenge to the institutions that, even under the most favorable of
circumstances, may prove to be beyond the Community's political
resources. 262 The chances of success in this integrationist venture can
only be aided by creating more room for majority-vote legislation and
by enlarging Parliament's opportunities to participate meaningfully in
the legislative process.
259. See supra notes 241-246 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 238, 247-248 & 257 and accompanying text.
261. The Single Act's belated substitution of the term Parliament for Assembly further
evidences an intent to elevate Parliament's standing. SEA, supra note 1, art. 3(1). The Euro-
pean Parliament had adopted that name of its own accord as early as 1962. Parliamentary
Resolution of March 30, 1962, 5 J.O. Comm. EUR. 1045 (1962).
262. On the progress to date of the internal market program, as assessed periodically by
the Commission, see supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
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C. The Future of the Luxembourg Accords
The Single European Act's emphasis on qualified majority vot-
ing, whether under the ordinary or the cooperation procedure for leg-
islation, gives new importance to the question of the continued vitality
of the Luxembourg Accords. 263 Under this so-called "gentlemen's
agreement" of 1966, every Member State enjoys a political veto over
measures it declares to be contrary to a vital national interest, even
when the Council ordinarily may adopt those measures by a simple or
qualified majority vote.264 If a Member State invokes a vital national
interest on any given matter, discussion in the Council must proceed
until consensus is reached.
Curiously, the Single Act does not directly address the question
of whether and to what extent the Luxembourg Accords, whose com-
patibility with the original Treaty has always been doubtful,265 survive
the expansion of qualified majority voting. In fact, the negotiators
appear to have sidestepped the issue altogether,266 and the Act does
not even acknowledge the Accords' existence. This situation can be
profitably contrasted with the treatment given the Luxembourg
Accords by Parliament's Draft Treaty of European Union. That
treaty expressly provided for a ten-year transitional period during
which a Member State might continue to require the postponement of
action it considered contrary to its vital national interests, but only if
the state invoking that right gave a reasoned explanation for doing so
and the Commission certified that the national interest implicated was
indeed vital.267 The contrast between the Draft Treaty's precision on
the future of the Luxembourg Accords and the Single Act's silence on
the subject is striking.
Although it avoided the matter, the Single European Act does
not provide a hospitable climate for the Luxembourg Accords. It is
263. For the text of the Luxembourg Accords, see 9 BULL EUR. ECON. COMM. (No. 3) 9
(1966).
264. See generally Campbell, The Single European Act and the Implications, 35 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 932, 935 (1986). The Luxembourg Accords are actually subject to various inter-
pretations. The French view traditionally has been that a measure on which the Accords are
invoked may be adopted only by consensus. Other states have considered that the Accords
simply require reasonable attempts to reach agreement. The Luxembourg Accords have been
called the framework for an "agreement to disagree" within the Community. Murphy, supra
note 3, at 18; Usher, supra note 242, at 65.
265. Campbell, supra note 264, at 935; Pescatore, supra note 19, at 13.
266. J. DE RUYT, supra note 42, at 117-18.
267. Draft Treaty, supra note 5, art. 23(3). The grounds for postponing action were to be
published. Id. The provision's wording ("the vote shall be postponed so that the matter may
be reexamined") preserves the ambiguity of the meaning of the Luxembourg Accords. See
supra note 264. The Dooge Committee Report, supra note 18, ch. III(A)(b), had also favored
developing criteria for resort to the Luxembourg Accords.
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doubtful that a national veto may properly be cast when, particularly
under the cooperation procedure, the Commission, a majority of the
Parliament, and a qualified majority of the Council all agree on a pol-
icy matter. The political pressures against casting a veto in such a
situation could and should be considerable,2 6 especially with respect
to harmonization measures in aid of the internal market capable of
adoption by qualified majority under article 100A. Now that a dissi-
dent state (subject of course to Commission and possibly Court
review) may invoke a vital national interest to justify the continued
application of national law in derogation from Community harmoni-
zation measures, resort to the political veto to prevent adoption of
those measures seems inappropriate.269
Even outside of the new cooperation procedure, survival of the
single state political veto is questionable. 270 Given that wider use of
majority voting has emerged as a principal strategy of institutional
reform, the compromise of that principle represented by the Luxem-
bourg Accords seems particularly outdated.27' More specifically, to
return to the practice of honoring Member State assertions of vital
national interest would subvert the Single Act's system of qualified
majority voting and thereby prejudice completion of the internal mar-
ket, the centerpiece of Community reform. Certainly the expansion in
community membership has only heightened the tendency toward
bloc-voting in the Council, which in turn makes attaining unanimity
on any legislative proposal increasingly problematic. Though argu-
ments may be made to the contrary, 72 these considerations on bal-
ance fortify the presumption that matters legally subject to qualified
268. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons described itself as
"extremely skeptical" about the ability of British governments to invoke the Luxembourg
compromise in the future, particularly in those areas of decisionmaking which the Single Act
now subjects to qualified majority voting. Campbell, supra note 264, at 936. For somewhat
different views, see McElhenny, supra note 89, at 61.
269. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
270. Resort to the Luxembourg Accords has become rare in recent years. An important
milestone was the Council's rejection of British assertions that the setting of farm prices in
1982 jeopardized vital national interests. The Council found that Britain was attempting to
use the veto on one matter (farm prices) in order to secure concessions on an unrelated matter
(the size of Britain's budgetary rebate). The episode is discussed in Campbell, supra note 264,
at 937-38.
271. There may be a relationship between the Single Act's emphasis on qualified major-
ity voting as an instrument of reform and the then very recent pattern of disuse of the Luxem-
bourg Accords. See J. DE RUYT, supra note 42, at 117. Article 3 of the Act lends some textual
support to the view that the Accords have no further place in Community practice. It affirms
that the Community institutions "shall exercise their powers and jurisdiction under the condi-
tions ... provided for by the Treaties."
272. Arguably, if the Accords initially operated as a corrective to tyranny by the major-
ity in the Council of Ministers, their utility has only increased with the Single Act's extension
of qualified majority decisionmaking.
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majority voting under the EEC Treaty should be decided in precisely
that way.
VI. CONCLUSION
Measured against Parliament's Draft Treaty of European Union
and other recent reform proposals, as well as against the stated prefer-
ences of the Commission and certain Member States, the Single Euro-
pean Act is not a revolutionary product. It consciously builds on
existing Community foundations and on practices that have devel-
oped over the last thirty years. To achieve the consensus necessary
for its adoption, the Act's drafters also deliberately sought to bal-
ance the concerns of the Community's twelve Member States. This
attempt to accommodate various national interests explains why the
package of institutional changes and extensions of Community com-
petence represented by the Act fails to reflect any single vision of
Community reform. Although their depiction as a giant step back-
ward for Europe273 falls wide of the mark, the jurisdictional and insti-
tutional provisions of the Single European Act do have a decidedly
modest and anticlimactic ring. -Certainly the Act as a whole does not
bring the Community appreciably closer to a state of political integra-
tion, much less a United States of Europe.
At this stage in Community history, can anything short of consti-
tutionally momentous reform preserve the momentum needed for
European political integration? The answer is a resounding "yes." In
eschewing grand constitutional change, the reformers not only com-
mitted no error but actually avoided one. They made the centerpiece
of their reform a set of attainable programmatic objectives in whose
service the entire acquis communautaire could readily be enlisted,
rather than a constitutional edifice whose appeal to the Member
States would be less than universal and whose durability in moments
of political difficulty could not be assured. Fortunately, the institu-
tional changes that have been introduced, though modest, are calcu-
lated to make more effective the very governmental processes upon
which the integrationist effort ultimately depends.
However unlikely it might seem against the background of origi-
nal expectations and more recent hopes, the establishment of an area
without internal frontiers as a reform strategy touches a receptive
chord in contemporary European thinking. By most accounts, it
serves the common economic interests of the Member States and their
273. Pescatore, supra note 19, at 9. Judge Pescatore describes the Single European Act
as "unfortunately negative in most respects" and as "a severe setback for the European Com-
munity." Id. See generally Lodge, supra note 20, at 221.
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populations.27 4 Its verifiable successes will generate a solidarity in
economic fact, if not immediately in political theory. These successes
will be felt concretely by a public whose confidence in the Community
is critical to the furtherance of European political integration. At the
same time, the failures of the internal market promise to be, at most,
partial and essentially matters of degree. Because the dismantling of
economic borders directly affects the people of Europe, it has a far
greater capacity to mobilize opinion than abstract visions of a United
States of Europe which are not yet widely shared. In targeting such
goals, the architects of Community reform remained faithful to their
functionalist tradition, 7 5 without either abandoning or even compro-
mising their ultimate ambition of a European Union.276 Despite the
urging and the obvious temptations, they wisely did not attempt to
produce European political integration simply by declaring it.
274. See McAleese & Matthews, The Single European Act and Ireland: Implications for
a Small Member State, 26 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 39, 57-59 (1987).
275. Functionalism basically posits that as governments jointly delegate decisionmaking
authority to intergovernmental political institutions, those institutions tend to develop collec-
tive decisional processes. By a certain "spillover effect," the resulting sectoral integration of
national economies in turn renders necessary even greater political and economic integration.
Thus the conditions are created for still larger transfers of political power to the collective
institutions. The decisive functionalist writings on the European Communities were E. HAAS.
THE UNITING OF EUROPE (1958); L. LINDBERG, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1963).
276. At the outset, the Single Act affirms the signatories' intention "to transform rela-
tions as a whole among their States into a European Union." SEA, supra note 1, preamble.
para. 1. See also id. art. 1, para. 1.
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